College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty and Deans

2011

No Place for Children: Addressing Urban Blight
and its Impact on Children Through Child
Protection Law, Domestic Relations Law, and
"Adult-only" Residential Zoning
James G. Dwyer
William & Mary Law School, jgdwye@wm.edu

Repository Citation
Dwyer, James G., "No Place for Children: Addressing Urban Blight and its Impact on Children Through Child Protection Law,
Domestic Relations Law, and "Adult-only" Residential Zoning" (2011). Faculty Publications. 1234.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/1234

Copyright c 2011 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs

NO PLACE FOR CHILDREN:
ADDRESSING URBAN BLIGHT AND ITS IMPACT ON CHILDREN
THROUGH CHILD PROTECTION LAW, DOMESTIC RELATIONS
LAW, AND “ADULT-ONLY” RESIDENTIAL ZONING
James G. Dwyer∗
INTRODUCTION ................................................................... 888
I. IDENTIFYING UNFIT COMMUNITIES ......................................896
II. INDIFFERENCE TO COMMUNITY UNFITNESS IN CURRENT
LEGAL RULES ................................................................ 899
A. Government Control of How Private Parties Use
Physical Space .......................................................... 900
B. Domestic Relations and Child Protection Laws That Determine
Children’s Residences..................................................902
1. Parentage ........................................................... 902
a. Maternity and Paternity ...................................... 903
b. Adoption........................................................904
2. Awarding Custody After Parental Separation ................. 908
3. Removing Children from Parental Custody .................... 910
4. Returning a Child to Parental Custody ......................... 912
5. Termination of Parental Rights .................................. 912
6. Summary ............................................................ 913
III. INJECTING COMMUNITY QUALITY INTO STATE DECISION MAKING
ABOUT CHILDREN’S LIVES.................................................914
A. Zoning for Child Protection ........................................... 914
B. Amending Domestic Relations and Child Protection Laws ....... 918
IV. A CHILD’S RIGHT TO A SAFE NEIGHBORHOOD .........................924
V. OBJECTIONS .................................................................. 929
A. Punishing Parents for Things Other Than Their
Own Conduct ............................................................ 931
B. Disparate Impact on Persons Who Are Poor or
of Minority Race ........................................................ 937
C. The Reforms Would Harm the Very Persons They Aim
To Benefit ................................................................ 939
∗
Professor of Law, William & Mary School of Law. I am greatly indebted to Tim Zick, Bill
Van Alstyne, and Scott Dodson for their invaluable input into this Article.

6

888

Alabama Law Review

[Vol.62:5:887

D. Effect on Community ................................................... 942
E. Infringement of Adults’ Constitutional Rights ......................944
1. Freedom in Choice of Residential Location .................... 944
a. Right To Travel ............................................... 945
b. Takings ......................................................... 947
c. Substantive Due Process ..................................... 948
2. Parental Rights.....................................................950
a. Right to Legal Parenthood................................... 951
b. Control Rights of Legal Parents ............................ 952
3. State Defense of the Reforms ..................................... 953
F. Summary ................................................................. 956
CONCLUSION ...................................................................... 957

INTRODUCTION
If there were a hell on earth for children, it might look something like
this: They live in small, rat and cockroach-infested apartments in crumbling buildings with utilities in disrepair. With few jobs in the neighborhood to provide income for inhabitants, apartments are overcrowded with
siblings, half-siblings, cousins, various adult family members, and an often-changing cast of non-family members. Their homes never feel safe
because the dysfunctions of the outside world enter on a regular basis.
Some of the adults bring in drugs and weapons. Gunshot sounds—and
sometimes bullets—come through the windows. Severe stress weighs on
everyone’s mind and emotions, leading to violent outbursts and sexual
exploitation. The children are effectively trapped in this environment because the world outside is menacing. AIDS-infected drug addicts lie in a
stupor in building hallways. On the streets, drug dealers stand on corners
and try to lure children into the trade, prostitutes stand on other corners,
child sex predators look out windows of nearby buildings, and members of
rival gangs cruise the streets intimidating residents. The walk to school is
harrowing, and it hardly seems worth the risk because the school suffers
from dilapidation, burnt-out teachers, and frequent gang-related violence.
There are no outdoor spaces safe for play, so children are in “lock down”
in their apartments except when they go to school. Simply breathing anywhere in their world poses a threat; the air is clogged with pollutants from
nearby factories and highways. High rates of mortality, sickness, delinquency, and depression characterize children’s lives.
This depiction resembles many actual residential environments in
America and other western nations today, places where children are now
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living, and where many are prematurely dying.1 A large literature on urban blight describes the causes, nature, effects, and attempts at solving the
problem.2 Its seriously adverse impact on children is well-documented.3
Yet legal scholars have ignored “neighborhood effect” on children in discussing the law of child protection, parentage, adoption, divorce, and land
use. This Article aims to correct this oversight. It advances several proposals—some fairly dramatic—aimed at sparing children from living in the
worst urban areas and, more generally, at moving children toward better
residential locations. And it presents moral and constitutional arguments as
to why government must implement these proposals.
For any child, residential location is a large determinant of well-being.
At the negative extreme, a neighborhood can pose threats to children’s
well-being far exceeding those present within the home in typical cases of
child protection removal.4 The worst neighborhoods pose direct threats to
See infra Part I.
See, e.g., FROM DESPAIR TO HOPE: HOPE VI AND THE NEW PROMISE OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN
AMERICA’S CITIES (Henry G. Cisneros & Lora Engdahl eds., 2009) [hereinafter FROM DESPAIR TO
HOPE]; DAVID J. ERICKSON, THE HOUSING POLICY REVOLUTION: NETWORKS AND NEIGHBORHOODS
(2009); MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER, SUSAN J. POPKIN & LYNETTE RAWLINGS, PUBLIC HOUSING AND
THE LEGACY OF SEGREGATION (2009); GASTON ALONSO, NOEL S. ANDERSON, CELINA SU & JEANNE
THEOHARIS, OUR SCHOOLS SUCK: STUDENTS TALK BACK TO A SEGREGATED NATION ON THE
FAILURES OF URBAN EDUCATION (2009); COLIN GORDON, MAPPING DECLINE: ST. LOUIS AND THE
FATE OF THE AMERICAN CITY (2008); SEGREGATION: THE RISING COSTS FOR AMERICA (James H.
Carr & Nandinee K. Kutty eds., 2008); BRENDA ANN KENNEALLY, MONEY POWER RESPECT:
PICTURES OF MY NEIGHBORHOOD (2005) (Bushwick area of Brooklyn, NY); HOWARD GILLETTE, JR.,
CAMDEN AFTER THE FALL: DECLINE AND RENEWAL IN A POST-INDUSTRIAL CITY (2005); THE
GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA (Xavier de
Souza Briggs ed., 2005); WALTER THABIT, HOW EAST NEW YORK BECAME A GHETTO (2003); JILL
JONNES, SOUTH BRONX RISING: THE RISE, FALL, AND RESURRECTION OF AN AMERICAN CITY (2002);
NEIGHBORHOOD POVERTY: POLICY IMPLICATIONS IN STUDYING NEIGHBORHOODS, VOLS. I, II, AND III
(Jeanne Brooks-Gunn et al. eds., 2000); SEAN ZIELENBACH, THE ART OF REVITALIZATION:
IMPROVING CONDITIONS IN DISTRESSED INNER-CITY NEIGHBORHOODS (2000); LEALAN JONES ET AL.,
OUR AMERICA: LIFE AND DEATH ON THE SOUTH SIDE OF CHICAGO (1997); ALEX KOTLOWITZ, THE
OTHER SIDE OF THE RIVER: A STORY OF TWO TOWNS, A DEATH, AND AMERICA’S DILEMMA (1998)
(Detroit); ALEX KOTLOWITZ, THERE ARE NO CHILDREN HERE: THE STORY OF TWO BOYS GROWING
UP IN THE OTHER AMERICA (1991).
3.
See Dolores Acevedo-Garcia & Theresa L. Osypuk, Impacts of Housing and Neighborhoods
on Health: Pathways, Racial/Ethnic Disparities, and Policy Directions, in SEGREGATION: THE RISING
COSTS FOR AMERICA, supra note 2, at 208–16; TURNER, POPKIN & RAWLINGS, supra note 2, at 79–
82; Prudence Brown & Harold A. Richman, Neighborhood Effects and State and Local Policy, in 2
NEIGHBORHOOD POVERTY: POLICY IMPLICATIONS IN STUDYING NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 2;
Deborah L. Shelton, Students Take Academic Hit When a Slaying is Close to Their Home, CHI. TRIB.
(June 14, 2010), http:// articles. chicagotribune. com/ 2010-06-14/ news/ ct-met-homicide-impactschildren-20100614_ 1_ homicide-children-violence.
4.
See infra Part I. Social scientists often use “community” or “local community” interchangeably with “neighborhood,” but also at times differentiate the two. See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson, The
Neighborhood Context of Investing in Children: Facilitating Mechanisms and Undermining Risks, in
SECURING THE FUTURE: INVESTING IN CHILDREN FROM BIRTH TO COLLEGE 207 (Sheldon Danziger &
Jane Waldfogel eds., 2000); 2 NEIGHBORHOOD POVERTY: POLICY IMPLICATIONS IN STUDYING
NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 2, at 16–17, 191–92. In addition, there is substantial literature on how
best to delimit a community or neighborhood for purposes of study—for example, based on geographic
boundaries or based on residents’ perception of the spatial limits of their social or public lives. See id.
at xx, 191–92. For this Article, it is not necessary to describe or assess the debates on these issues. I
1.
2.
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children’s physical and psychological well-being, and they also adversely
affect children indirectly by creating stressors that undermine parents’
abilities to care for children.5 Pervasive crime and substance abuse, in
particular, substantially elevate risks to children beyond those created just
by less capable or less motivated parents. Given that a relatively high percentage of adults who live in the worst neighborhoods are marginal to begin with, in terms of their inherent capacities for giving care and maintaining safe and healthy homes,6 the additional threats present in the larger
residential environment push the experience of most children in such
neighborhoods below what most people—including those who live in the
neighborhoods—would regard as a minimally acceptable quality of life.
Because such neighborhoods are also likely to have inadequate—even dangerous—schools and few legal employment opportunities,7 living in them
severely diminishes the life prospects of children forced to grow up in
them.
Government officials at all levels have endeavored to eliminate such
toxic environments for at least the past half-century. Without denying the
success there has been in reforming some blighted urban areas,8 this Article begins with the premise that there are still many residential areas in
will use the terms interchangeably, as is common in everyday discourse, meaning by both a place
where a substantial number of people live and interact with each other to some degree on a more or
less daily basis. My concern is with the world a child inhabits beyond the home that has an impact on
the child’s life, however that is characterized or defined. Implementing my proposal as to zoning or
declaring communities unfit would, of course, require determining the boundaries of the condemned
area, but local officials could do so based on census tract boundaries, their familiarity with local
neighborhoods, and input from local residents, police, and community leaders, without needing to
answers all the questions that puzzle researchers.
5.
See, e.g., 2 NEIGHBORHOOD POVERTY: POLICY IMPLICATIONS IN STUDYING
NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 2, at xx, 191–92; Acevedo-Garcia & Osypuk, supra note 3, at 221;
James Garbarino, Catherine P. Bradshaw & Kathleen Kostelny, Neighborhood and Community Influences on Parenting, in PARENTING: AN ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 297–318 (Tom Luster & Lynn
Okagaki eds., 1993); Serena Maria Daniels, For Some Chicago Kids, There’s No Escape From Violence, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 23, 2010), http:// articles. chicagotribune. com/ 2010-08-23/ news/ ct-metrelocated-violence- 20100823 _1_fenger-student- agape-community- center-derrion- albert; Susan
Saulny, Graduation is the Goal, Staying Alive the Prize, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2010), http:// www.
nytimes. com/ 2010/ 07/02/ us/02 chicago. html? sq=& st=nyt &adxnnl =1&scp =1&adxnnlx
=1312055938- CDC1w XYklcfqi 31UocMVVA; Ray Rivera, In Newburgh, Gangs and Violence
Reign, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2010, http:// www. nytimes. com/2010/05/12/ nyregion/12newburgh.html? adxnnl =1&adxnnlx= 1312056024-U8MKqOB fMgx3MikBq Zj8VA; Peter
Aldhous, Neighborhoods That Can Kill; The Strain of Living in Chicago’s Crime-Ridden South Side
Seems to Send Tumours into Overdrive. It’s Just One Example of a Social Environment That Leads
Directly to Poorer Health, NEW SCIENTIST, Jan. 16, 2010; TURNER, POPKIN & RAWLINGS, supra note
2, at 85.
6.
See James H. Carr & Nandinee K. Kutty, The New Imperative for Equality, in SEGREGATION:
THE RISING COSTS FOR AMERICA, supra note 2, at 19; THABIT, supra note 2, at 266–67.
7.
See Carr & Kutty, supra note 6, at 19–20; Kristen Mack, Stephanie Banchero & Annie Sweeney, Fenger High School: Fear, Frustration Come to Campus: Days after an Honor Student was Slain,
Kids List the Perils of Walking to School, While Parents Demand a Halt to Violence, CHI. TRIB. (Sept.
29, 2009), http:// articles. chicagotribune. com/ 2009-09-29/news/ 0909280834 _1_campus- studentsfear.
8.
For accounts of perceived successes, see JONNES, supra note 2.

2011]

No Place for Children

891

the western world today that are simply unsuitable places for children to
grow up, regardless of how competent their parents are, places where
most parents would not want to bring their child for even an hour, yet in
which many children are now forced to live day in and day out. I further
assume that current or contemplated public policy measures to reform such
places are not going to succeed sufficiently in the foreseeable future to
spare all children now being born from being forced to grow up in hellish
residential environments. Attempts to improve the quality of life in the
worst neighborhoods often have little success,9 and children are sometimes
the last to benefit from such efforts.10 Even when urban renewal efforts
succeed, they generally take many years and succeed only by relocating
the problem from one part of a city to another.11 During periods of economic downturn, such efforts are especially unlikely to succeed; in fact,
the pockets of deep, chronic, widespread poverty in western cities are
likely to grow during such times with all of the ills that such poverty generates—violent crime, drugs, bad schools, lack of opportunity, and other
threats to children’s health, safety, and chances for fulfilling lives.12 The
9.
See generally Susan J. Popkin & Mary K. Cunningham, Beyond the Projects: Lessons from
Public Housing Transformation in Chicago, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND
HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA, supra note 2; Mireya Navarro, Lead Poisoning, a
Stubborn Nemesis, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2010), http: //www. nytimes. com/ 2010/04 /22/nyregion/
22lead. html? adxnnl= 1&adxnnlx =1312056 273- uFgl5E WxDzvJE/ +XwOh Avg; see also, Cara
Buckley, Public Housing Repairs Can’t Keep Pace With Need, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2010), http://
www. nytimes. com/2010 /10/25/ nyregion /25repairs .html?a dxnnl =1&adxnnl x=1312 056327 –
mPySa xHEAulr+U etv/oK+Q.
10.
Susan J. Popkin & Mary K. Cunningham, Has HOPE VI Transformed Residents’ Lives?, in
FROM DESPAIR TO HOPE, supra note 2, at 199 (noting that families with many young children were
among those “hard[est]-to-house” in urban revitalization programs).
11.
See Tim Heffernan, Close-Up on Mott Haven, Bronx, THE VILL. VOICE, Sept. 27, 2005,
http:// www.villagevoice. com/ 2005- 09-27/ nyc-life/ close- up-on- mott- haven- bronx/ (describing
gentrification of South Bronx—that is, more affluent New York City residents moving into renovated
properties and pricing out poor residents, causing the latter to move, with their problems, to other
neighborhoods); John Bebow & Antonio Olivo, CHA Moves Tenants Out—But Not Up; Ex-Residents
Still Live in Struggling, Segregated Areas, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 27, 2005), http:// articles. chicagotribune.
com/2 005- 02-27 /news/ 050227 0543_1 _public- housing-chicago -housing- authority- cha/3 (discussing Chicago’s decade-long Plan for Transformation, which critics say just exported the public housing
problems to residential blocks that are growing increasingly unstable); ALEXANDER VON HOFFMAN,
HOUSE BY HOUSE, BLOCK BY BLOCK: THE REBIRTH OF AMERICA’S URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS 251–52
(2003) (noting that in urban areas where inner-city rejuvenation has occurred, this has typically entailed re-creation of blight in satellite neighborhoods to which the poorest city residents are dislocated); JONNES, supra note 2, at 434–35 (discussing migration of drug trafficking in step with police
entry into neighborhoods); John A. Powell & Marguerite L. Spencer, Giving Them the Old “OneTwo”: Gentrification and the K.O. of Impoverished Urban Dwellers of Color, 46 HOW. L.J. 433
(2003). On the slowness of reform efforts, see BROWN & RICHMAN, supra note 3, at 164–68;
GILLETTE, supra note 2, at 245–46; Sampson, supra note 4, at 216–18.
12.
See Carr & Kutty, supra note 6, at 16 (noting an increase in recent years in the number of
people living in areas of concentrated poverty in the U.S.); National League of Cities, CITY FISCAL
CONDITIONS 2009; Sam Dolnick, Problems Mount at a Bronx Building Bought in a Bubble,
N.Y.TIMES (Jan. 19, 2010), http: //query .nytimes. com/ gst /fullpage .html ?res= 9F01E6D
61438F9 3AA25752 C0A9669 D8B63 (describing setbacks to urban renewal effort caused by recession); Joseph Goldstein, Police Force Nearly Halved, Camden Feels Impact, N.Y.TIMES (Mar. 6, 2011),
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only way to ensure that children do not suffer the effects of growing up in
deeply dysfunctional communities is to separate them as early as possible
from the adults who are creating toxic social environments in impoverished areas. Efforts to remove those adults—for example, by criminal law
enforcement—have generally not worked. The logical alternative is to remove the children.
In fact, programs that have assisted parents who wished to relocate
with their children from high-poverty, inner-city neighborhoods to lowpoverty areas have greatly improved the children’s well-being and longterm life prospects.13 This Article presents a novel argument for expanding
such relocation programs, an argument founded upon basic rights of children—not rights against private actors who might harm them, though children certainly possess such rights, but rather rights against the state. I argue
that the state violates basic rights of children by making certain decisions
about children’s lives that effectively consign many of them to living in
hellish conditions. To remedy this violation of children’s rights, the state
should now institute reforms such as giving children first priority in distribution of housing vouchers and in provision of relocation assistance and,
most controversially, making relocation out of the most dangerous neighborhoods mandatory rather than voluntary for parents who have and wish
to retain custody of children. The state should no more permit parents to
house children in apartments where stray bullets come through windows
and drug addicts clutter the hallways outside than permit parents to take
children into casinos and nightclubs.
This Article argues that the state is legally free, and in fact morally
and legally obligated, to adopt new legal rules and policies aimed at ensuring that no children live in the horrible neighborhoods that exist, and likely will always exist, in our society. It also presents a constitutional lever
for overcoming political and community resistance to taking the necessary
measures. These measures would entail changes to the law in three broad
areas—child maltreatment, domestic relations, and zoning. Part II shows
that state decision making in these areas is now largely indifferent to
“neighborhood effect” on child welfare. Part III recommends specific
amendments to the law to correct this deficiency. Parts IV and V then
present the normative theory in support of these reforms.
The legal reforms that Part III presents, though novel and potentially
radical in their effects, actually entail simply extending concepts and rules
already enshrined in the law. First, child protection law now routinely
http:// www. nytimes. com/ 2011/ 03/07/ nyregion/07camden.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all.
13.
See Acevedo-Garcia, James & Osypuk, supra note 3, at 220–23; TURNER, POPKIN &
RAWLINGS, supra note 2, at 2, 6–10, 81–82; Rosenbaum et al., New Capabilities in New Places: LowIncome Black Families in Suburbia, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING
CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 150, 158; Popkin & Cunningham, supra note
9, at 189.
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employs the concept of unfitness for childrearing, applying it both to individual persons and to living spaces. Unfit parents are persons with particular characteristics, such as drug addiction, mental illness, or demonstrated
propensity to maltreat children, that render them unsuitable to serve as
caretakers for children.14 Unfit or unsuitable homes for children are living
quarters that contain dangers, such as guns or drugs within children’s
reach, that have extremely unsanitary conditions, or to which violent persons or sexual predators have regular access.15 Child protection workers
routinely react to parental fitness or home unsuitability by relocating children. Part III of the Article recommends extending the concept of unfitness
to groupings of people—that is, communities—and to larger living environments—that is, neighborhoods—and reacting in similar ways to identification of unfitness. Just as the state now takes measures to keep children
out of the custody of unfit parents and away from individual living environments deemed unsuitable for children, the state would treat some
communities and neighborhoods as unfit for child rearing and separate
children from them. Similarly, the law should include within the concept
of parental unfitness a parent’s living in a manifestly dangerous and unhealthy neighborhood, just as it now includes a parent’s living on a park
bench or under a bridge.16 In no case is the purpose to punish or blame
parents for their circumstances; rather, it is just to recognize that some
birth parents are, for whatever reason, unable in their current circumstances to provide an adequate child-rearing environment.
Domestic relations law also assesses the relative fitness of individuals
and homes, routinely in divorce and adoption proceedings and less commonly in maternity and paternity proceedings, and it rests decisions about
where and with whom children will live on deficiencies in parenting or
home environments. Part III recommends simply supplementing existing
parentage and child custody rules with direction to courts that they consider neighborhood quality as well as parental and household quality when
they decide with whom a child will live. This innovation would have an
effect broader than just addressing urban blight; it would result in children
more generally moving toward better residential environments. 17
Zoning law rests on the concept that particular places are suitable for
some uses and unsuitable for others, based sometimes on the physical environment but also sometimes based on the social environment. Business
regulations similarly restrict what may be done inside particular public
14.
See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(1)(D) (1993).
15.
See, e.g., In re Clark, No. 275346, 2007 WL 2051656 (Mich. Ct. App. July 17, 2007) (upholding trial court termination of parental rights of mother who could not maintain suitable home).
16.
See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1 (2010) (defining “unfit person” to include a parent who
repeatedly fails to provide a child with “adequate” shelter, and defining “neglected child” to include a
child who fails to receive adequate shelter).
17.
See infra Part II.B.1.b.2.
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places, and these include restrictions aimed at protecting children, typically by precluding them from entering unsuitable environments (e.g., night
clubs, casinos, betting parlors, and factories). Part III recommends that
state and local governments create subcategories of residential use, one of
which would be “adult only” or “no child” zones. Just as the state now
designates some spaces as unsuitable for any human habitation and some
businesses as unsuitable for children’s entry, it should begin to designate
some areas as unsuitable for habitation by children specifically because of
the social and physical environment that exists in them, and enforce a categorical prohibition on residence by children in those areas. Whatever the
suitability of blighted neighborhoods for habitation by adults and whatever
the state’s obligation to adults now living in such places, the state should
not tolerate children living in them.18
Similarly, public housing policy since the early 1990s has, in addition
to renovation of blighted areas, emphasized dispersal of urban residents,
on a voluntary basis, from neighborhoods with high-poverty to lowpoverty areas within or outside the cities using housing vouchers. Part III
recommends giving first priority for relocation subsidies and support services to children and their caregivers and making relocation mandatory for
parents who wish to retain custody of their children rather than voluntary.
These zoning and housing policy proposals offer the most comprehensive
and immediate approach to keeping children out of the worst social environments; they would affect entire residential areas and populations of
children all at once, rather than one household or one child at a time as
child maltreatment and domestic relations actions do.
Part IV presents the normative foundation for these recommendations.
It argues that children have a moral and constitutional right against the
state making decisions about their lives that result in their living in unfit
communities. It demonstrates that, although children’s residences might
appear to be the consequence of solely private action, the state is actually
deeply implicated in the fate of children currently living in horrible neighborhoods. This is not just because many of the worst residential environments are in government-constructed and government-operated housing
projects, but because of the state’s determinative role in family formation
and its bestowing on parents plenary power over children’s lives, including the power to choose any residential area for the children to live. The
state must be accountable, morally and constitutionally, for the way it carries out that role and for its decisions as to the extent of control over
children’s lives it gives to parents, including control over where children
live.

18.
Cf. Acevedo-Garcia & Osypuk, supra note 3, at 215–16 (showing that the impact of neighborhood dysfunction is greater on children than on adults).
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Part V addresses arguments against deeming communities unfit and
against considering the neighborhood quality in state decision making
about children’s relational lives. It responds to the contention that the state
should not “punish” parents for the conduct of others in their community
nor blame them for living in an environment that they did not themselves
create and that they might not be able to leave. It addresses potential constitutional objections, including those based on a right to choose where one
lives or a right to be a parent and have custody of one’s children. Though
such a constitutional challenge should not succeed in blocking the reforms,
it might force the state to provide more financial relocation assistance,
including expansion of current housing subsidy programs. Part V also
addresses concerns about a disparate impact on the family lives of poor
and minority race persons and about further eroding the quality of life in
bad neighborhoods. Though the Article’s focus is on potential legal reforms to improve the lives of children and on the normative case for and
against those reforms, the Conclusion will also offer some thoughts about
the practicalities of implementing these reforms.
This Article’s substantive focus is on dangers to children arising from
dysfunctions correlated with chronic poverty, but there are also community-wide dangers that arise from other sources, and the Article’s analysis
and conclusions would apply to them as well. One other source is ideology. Though less widespread than poverty, cult behavior is a significant
problem for children in the United States. The revelation of under-age sex
and under-age “marriage” in a fundamentalist Mormon community in Eldorado, Texas is one example.19 Another such cult situation, one that had
a horrifically tragic ending, was that of the Branch Davidians in Waco,
Texas. In the early ‘90s, the nation watched in horror as dozens of children, after living for years in a cult compound where adults regularly had
sex with minors, burned to death at the command of the cult’s leader.20 As
these examples illustrate, in some communities in America, ideology
drives members to reclusiveness, which inhibits child welfare agencies’
abilities to monitor and protect children’s well-being, and it gives community leaders a justification internally for practices that are harmful to children and that might develop for non-ideological reasons, such as brute lust.
Some estimates put the current number of cults in the United States in the
thousands, and though a cult might exist without any abuse of children and
without otherwise creating an unhealthy environment for children, re-

19.
See David Von Drehle, The Texas Polygamist Sect: Uncoupled and Unchartered, TIME
MAGAZINE (Apr. 24, 2008), http:// www. time. com/ time/ magazine/ article/ 0,9171, 1734818
,00.html.
20.
See Tim Weiner, Warnings of a Disaster in Waco Were Ignored, Witness Testifies, N.Y.
TIMES (July 22, 1995), http:// www. nytimes. com/ 1995/07/22/ us/ warnings- of-a- disaster- in-wacowere-ignored-witness-testifies. html ?src =pm.
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search and autobiographical accounts suggest that child abuse, particularly
sexual abuse, is a common feature of such groups.21
The state now generally leaves such insular communities unsupervised, and when problems come to light few ask whether the state should
have removed all the children long before, with or without their parents,
based simply on the nature of the community. This Article incidentally
raises that question. Consistent with the conclusion I reach regarding
communities whose dysfunction arises from pervasive and chronic poverty, I conclude that the state should also declare some insular ideological
communities unfit for children, and that, at a minimum, agencies and
courts in parentage, child protection, and custody proceedings should
count against any parents or would-be parents that they live in a cult-like
community whose way of life is hidden from public view, especially if the
community’s ideology encourages conduct toward children that the state
believes to be harmful. The role of ideology in such communities elevates
the child welfare concern insofar as it means that some environmental influences the state deems harmful to children in these communities are deliberate rather than an unintended consequence of conduct undertaken for
other reasons. However, it also gives rise to an additional objection to
state condemnation of the communities and state efforts to keep children
out of them—namely, the First Amendment right of community members
to live in accordance with their religious beliefs. Part V addresses that
objection as well.
I. IDENTIFYING UNFIT COMMUNITIES
Among first world nations, the United States has a relatively high rate
of child poverty and of substance abuse and an average rate of crime.22
21.
See, e.g., CAROLYN JESSOP, ESCAPE (2007); FLORA JESSOP & PAUL T. BROWN, CHURCH OF
LIES (2009); ELISSA WALL, STOLEN INNOCENCE: MY STORY OF GROWING UP IN A POLYGAMOUS
SECT, BECOMING A TEENAGE BRIDE, AND BREAKING FREE OF WARREN JEFFS (2008); IRENE
SPENCER, SHATTERED DREAMS: MY LIFE AS A POLYGAMIST’S WIFE (2007); Saul Relative, 1 Mind
Ministries: 1 Mind for Murder but Only One Charged with Murder, ASSOCIATED CONTENT (Aug. 12),
http: //www. associatedcontent. com/article/9 49037/1_ mind_ministries_ 1_mind_ for_ murder. html;
Richard Read, Small ´Cottage Cults´ Drawing More Converts in United States, THE OREGONIAN (July
16, 2001), http:/ /www. oregonlive. com/s pecial/ guru/I ndex.s sf?/news/ oregonian/l c_11gs ide15
.frame.
22.
See Louisa Degenhardt et al., Toward a Global View of Alcohol, Tobacco, Cannabis, and
Cocaine Use: Findings from the WHO World Mental Health Surveys, 5 PLOS MED. 1053, 1059–61
(2008), available at http: //medicine. plosjournals. org/ archive/ 1549- 1676 /5/7/ pdf/ 10.1371
_journal. pmed. 0050141- L. pdf (Among the 17 nations studied, the U.S. had the highest rates of
cocaine (16.3%) and cannabis use (54%). France’s rates were 1.9% (cocaine) and 44.1% (cannabis),
while Spain’s rates were 5.3% and 27.7% and Germany’s 6.1% and 4.1% respectively.); ORG. FOR
ECON CO-OPERATION & DEV., GROWING UNEQUAL? INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND POVERTY IN OECD
COUNTRIES 138 (2008), available at http:// www. sourceoecd. org/ upload/ 8108051 etemp. pdf (In
the mid-2000s, the average rate of poverty for children in OECD countries was 11%. In the United
States, this rate was 18% as compared to 9% in the United Kingdom, 7% in France, and 12% in
Japan.); JAN VAN DIJK ET AL., CRIMINAL VICTIMISATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: KEY
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Within the United States, these problems can be found in some measure
anywhere, but certain localities suffer from especially high rates and, correspondingly, have especially low quality of life.23 These same areas generally also have the highest rates of reported child maltreatment24 and of
family circumstances that are known risk factors for maltreatment, including non-marital births25 and children whose biological parents are not living with each other.26 Thus, a relatively high percentage of children in
such neighborhoods are already the subjects of agency and court proceedings—in child protection cases, in paternity suits, and in custody or visitation disputes. Addressing extra-familial environmental hazards in those
proceedings would not increase state involvement in those children’s lives;
it would simply entail additional fact-finding. In fact, insofar as a more
comprehensive look at children’s lives today enhances state decision makers’ abilities to choose the best available situations for children, it should
FINDINGS FROM THE 2004-2005 ICVS AND EUICS 42, available at http: //rechten. uvt.nl/ icvs/
pdffiles/ ICVS2004 _05.pdf.
23.
See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2007, available at http:
//www. fbi.gov/ ucr/cius 2006/ data/ table _02. html (showing rate of violent crime in metropolitan
areas more than two and a half times as high as in non-metropolitan areas); SAMHSA, STATE
ESTIMATES OF SUBSTANCE USE FROM THE 2005-06 NATIONAL SURVEYS ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH 2
(2008), available at http:// www. oas. samhsa. gov/ 2k6state/ 2k6state. pdf, at 2 (showing highest rate
of cocaine use in Washington, D.C., more than three times the rate in North Dakota); SAMHSA,
SUBSTATE ESTIMATES FROM THE 2004-06 NATIONAL SURVEYS ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH
§ C(2008), available at http:// www. oas. samhsa. gov/ substate 2k8/ substate.pdf (showing significant
variation in rates of illicit drug use among regions within states and among wards within the District of
Columbia); SUNY DOWNSTATE MEDICAL CENTER, QUALITY OF LIFE IN THE NATION’S 100 LARGEST
CITIES AND THEIR SUBURBS: NEW AND CONTINUING CHALLENGES FOR IMPROVING HEALTH AND
WELL-BEING (2004) [hereinafter “Quality of Life”]; id. at 1 (stating that the rate of concentrated
poverty is 20 times greater in urban areas than in suburban areas of the U.S.); id. at 13 (showing that
Atlanta, Baltimore, and St. Louis had the highest rates of violent crime among U.S. cities in 2000); id.
at 24 (listing U.S. cities with highest rates of concentrated poverty); id. at 32 (listing U.S. cities with
highest rates of unemployment); id. at 34 (listing U.S. cities with highest rates of violent crime); id. at
36 (listing U.S. cities with overall highest rate of “social deprivation”).
24.
URBAN PROBLEMS AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 251–53 (Ronald F. Ferguson & William
T. Dickens eds., 1999) (noting that crime, child maltreatment, delinquency, and other social problems
are often bundled together in impoverished areas); Claudia J. Coulton et al., How Neighborhoods
Influence Child Maltreatment: A Review of the Literature and Alternative Pathways, 31 CHILD ABUSE
& NEGLECT 1117, 1132–33 (2007) (discussing well-documented link between neighborhoods with high
crime, poverty, and alcohol use and child abuse and neglect).
25.
Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Disparities in Rates of Unintended Pregnancy in
the United States, 1994 and 2001, 38 PERSP. ON SEXUAL AND REPROD. HEALTH 90, 93–94 (2006)
(Among women reporting unintended births, 58% of these women lived below the poverty line. “In
2001, poor women had unintended births at five times the rate of their counterparts in the highest
income category.”).
26.
See THE FED. RESERVE SYS. & THE BROOKINGS INST., THE ENDURING CHALLENGE OF
CONCENTRATED POVERTY IN AMERICA: CASE STUDIES FROM COMMUNITIES ACROSS THE U.S. 119,
174, 160–61 (David Erickson et al. eds., 2008), available at http:// www. frbsf. org/ cpreport/ docs/
cp_ fullreport. pdf (noting that high proportion of single parent households contributes to concentrated
poverty, finding a strong correlation between single parent households and high rates of poverty in
East Albany, NY, and observing that 48 percent of the population of Northwest Milwaukee living in
poverty and 52.7 percent of the population comprised of single parent households); Sampson, supra
note 4, at 209, 215.
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reduce the need for subsequent legal proceedings involving children, such
as neglect proceedings, delinquency petitions, and custody change requests.
In the past decade, many social scientists have conducted comparative
assessments of different neighborhoods within particular cities, based on
aggregate data, in terms of the impact that neighborhood environment has
on children. Their work evidences the feasibility of objective assessments
of neighborhood quality, and it confirms what is obvious from the ethnographic accounts—namely, a neighborhood effect independent of parental
characteristics. Regardless of how devoted and competent parents are,
living in the nation’s worst neighborhoods adversely impacts children’s
physical health, cognitive and emotional development, school performance, socialization, behavior, and opportunities.27
Specifically, recent research shows that children in areas of concentrated poverty are much more likely than children in other communities to
be killed or injured by gunshot, witness violence and drug addiction, suffer from depression, drop out of school, become gang members, become
drug addicts, and end up in prison.28 Comparison of high-poverty communities with more affluent communities shows a high correlation between
concentrated poverty and elevated rates of child mortality and chronic disease, poor nutrition and health care among children, bad public schools,
unemployment, and environmental toxins such as lead paint, rats, hazardous waste, air pollution, and noise.29 When a neighborhood is characte27.
See DELBERT S. ELLIOTT ET AL., GOOD KIDS FROM BAD NEIGHBORHOODS: SUCCESSFUL
DEVELOPMENT IN SOCIAL CONTEXT (2006); ANNE R. PEBLEY & MARY E. VAIANA, IN OUR
BACKYARD: HOW 3 L.A. NEIGHBORHOODS AFFECT KIDS’ LIVES (2002); Martha A. Gephart, Neighborhoods and Communities as Contexts for Development, in 1 NEIGHBORHOOD POVERTY: POLICY
IMPLICATIONS IN STUDYING NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 2, at 13, 28, 30; Nancy Darling & Laurence
Steinberg, Community Influences on Adolescent Achievement and Deviance, in 2 NEIGHBORHOOD
POVERTY: POLICY IMPLICATIONS IN STUDYING NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 2, at 126–30; Spencer et
al., An Alternative Approach to Assessing Neighborhood Effects on Early Adolescent Achievement and
Problem Behavior, in 2 NEIGHBORHOOD POVERTY: POLICY IMPLICATIONS IN STUDYING
NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 2, at 145–46, 157–58.
28.
See Danielle H. Dallaire et al., Predicting Children’s Depressive Symptoms from Community
and Individual Risk Factors, 37 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 830, 831 (2008); Robert L. Wagmiller,
Jr., Children and the Changing Social Ecology of Economic Disadvantage in Urban America, in 1
CHILD POVERTY IN AMERICA TODAY: FAMILIES AND CHILDREN 163 (Barbara A. Arrighi & Davis J.
Maume eds., 2007); Gephart, supra note 27, at 13, 27, 35, 39; Jill E. Korbin & Claudia J. Coulton,
Understanding the Neighborhood Context for Children and Families: Combining Epidemiological and
Ethnographic Approaches, in 2 NEIGHBORHOOD POVERTY: POLICY IMPLICATIONS IN STUDYING
NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 2, at 69–75.
29.
See JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA’S SCHOOLS (1991);
QUALITY OF LIFE, supra note 23, at 6 (“Research has found a strong link between concentrated poverty and unemployment, poor educational achievement, high crime rates and other social ills.3 Higher
rates of disease and mortality are also associated with concentrated poverty.4 Poor residents living in
impoverished neighborhoods often have no grocery stores for buying fresh and affordable produce,
have much higher air and noise pollution levels and higher rates of poor housing conditions, such as
lead-based paint and high levels of rodent feces. In the poorest neighborhoods, preventable hospitalization rates (e.g., asthma admissions) are much higher than in affluent neighborhoods.”); id. at 16
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rized by a high percentage of unemployed adults and a high percentage of
single parents, it is likely to have a large criminal element, unsafe public
areas, few positive role models, few employment or job training opportunities for adolescents, and little inter-familial cooperation in monitoring
children.30 These community characteristics have a direct impact on children that is independent of parent characteristics and quality of home environment.31 At the same time, they undermine the ability of parents to parent successfully because they increase stress, foster despair, present strong
competing influences, and remove needed external support.32
Not all poor neighborhoods suffer from these dysfunctions and dangers to children. It is important to look beyond the poverty rate in a given
location and examine directly important factors such as rates of crime and
drug use and presence or absence of positive social networks.33 But this
research makes clear that a community or neighborhood, as much as an
abusive or neglectful parent or an individual home, can present a serious
threat to the welfare and healthy development of children. Moreover, it is
a threat that is more readily apparent to the state, well in advance of its
realization in harm to children, than is the threat that parental unfitness
poses for children; local governments are well aware of the quality of life
and of statistics on crime, drug use, and other problems in the neighborhoods within their jurisdiction.
II. INDIFFERENCE TO COMMUNITY UNFITNESS IN CURRENT LEGAL RULES
Despite the clear impact that neighborhood quality has on child welfare, current laws governing state decisions that effectively determine
where children live are largely indifferent to that impact. This Part critiques current legal rules governing private use of physical space, parentage, custody disputes between parents, child protection removal from
parental custody, and termination of parental rights.

(reporting a strong correlation between quality of life indices and maternal/infant health); id. at 3
(stating the health services are generally deficient in poor communities).
30.
QUALITY OF LIFE, supra note 23, at 26; Frank Furstenbuerg, Jr., & Mary Elizabeth Hughes,
The Influence of Neighborhood on Children’s Development: A Theoretical Perspective and Research
Agenda, in 2 NEIGHBORHOOD POVERTY: POLICY IMPLICATIONS IN STUDYING NEIGHBORHOODS, supra
note 2, at 25–26; ELLIOTT ET AL., supra note 27, at 38, 42, 45, 48, 49, 112–18; Sampson, supra note
4, at 215; Gager et al., The Role of Poverty, Race/Ethnicity, and Regional Location in Youth Employment, in 3 CHILD POVERTY IN AMERICA TODAY: THE PROMISE OF EDUCATION, at 127–28 (Barbara A.
Arrighi & David J. Maume eds., 2007).
31.
Id. at 55, 81; Dallaire et al., supra note 28, at 831, 841; Sampson, supra note 4, at 216.
32.
Id. at 281; Robert J. Sampson & Jeffrey D. Morenoff, Ecological Perspectives of Urban
Poverty, in 2 NEIGHBORHOOD POVERTY: POLICY IMPLICATIONS IN STUDYING NEIGHBORHOODS, supra
note 2, at 19; Brown & Richman, supra note 3, at 171; Margaret G. Smith & Rowena Fong, THE
CHILDREN OF NEGLECT: WHEN NO ONE CARES 48–53 (2004).
33.
Id. at 197, 294.
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A. Government Control of How Private Parties Use Physical Space
The state generally decides the permissible uses of physical space
within its jurisdiction.34 In the United States, this typically occurs at the
municipal level; local zoning laws designate different areas for different
uses, such as industrial-only, commercial-only, or residential-only.35 Local
ordinances or state laws further proscribe specific types of activities that
would otherwise fall within the category of permissible uses—for example,
adult-only retail stores or religious services.36 The state thereby assumes
the power to restrict how private parties use property and to authorize
particular uses of private property.37 For example, designating some land
as industrial-only amounts to both prohibiting private parties from living
on it and empowering private parties to construct and operate factories and
warehouses on it. Designating some land as exclusively residential or
mixed residential and commercial amounts to both authorizing private parties to live on it and prohibiting private parties from using it for nondesignated purposes.38 In addition, the state invests legal parent status in
particular adults, through legal rules and processes described below, and it
confers powers on legal parents that include the power to decide where
34.
Edward H. ZIEGLER ET AL., 2 RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 1.2 (4th
ed. 2010).
35.
See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, GA., ZONING ORDINANCE art. 7, ch. 7.7, § 7.7.1-2 (2005) (designating certain areas Heavy Industrial (HI) districts “with the purpose of reserving certain areas . . . for
industrial operations which may be objectionable due to the emission of noise, vibration, smoke, dust,
gas, fumes, odors, or radiation and that may create fire or explosion hazards or other objectionable
conditions,” stating that “[u]ses involving human activity such as dwellings, care centers, and certain
commercial uses are not permitted,” and explaining that such districts “are highly unsuitable adjacent
to residential districts and are generally unfit for the sustained activity of humans and animals”);
RIVERSIDE, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE tit. 19, ch. 19.130, § 19.130.025 (2007); 1568 Montgomery
Highway, Inc. v. City of Hoover, 45 So. 3d 319 (Ala. 2010) (upholding state law criminalizing, and
municipal code prohibiting, operation of “adult-only enterprise” within 1000 feet of other particular
land uses).
36.
See, e.g., Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253 (3d Cir.
2007) (addressing city zoning ordinance and redevelopment plan excluding religious services from
permitted uses in zone where secular assemblies and institutions were permitted); Vineyard Christian
Fellowship of Evanston v. City of Evanston, 250 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (invalidating similar
ordinance); ZIEGLER ET AL., supra note 34, § 29:21; JULES B. GERARD & SCOTT D. BERGTHOLD,
LOCAL REGULATION OF ADULT BUSINESS § 1:3 (2010).
37.
One might challenge the suggestion that the state “authorizes” private parties to use property
in particular ways, contending that private parties have a natural right or presumptive freedom to use
their property however they wish and that there is no state action or involvement when the state chooses simply not to prohibit particular uses. But the law, a product of state action, creates and defines the
scope of private parties’ legal rights to property, and the state stands ready to enforce those rights
against private parties or other governmental units that might seek to interfere with particular uses of
property. So, for example, if a municipality possesses zoning power and its zoning board designates
certain areas as residential, property owners can rely on that designation to guard against efforts by
other private parties, by state or federal governments, or by some other municipal agency to prevent
construction or habitation of houses or apartment buildings on the land.
38.
For discussion of the impact—positive or negative—that specific-use zoning can have on
quality of life in urban areas, see generally Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering (and Order in) the City, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1 (2004).
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their children live. These two sets of rules in combination make the state a
but-for causal agent in any child’s residential circumstances; only because
the state assigns a child to a legal relationship with and custody of particular adults, and then authorizes and empowers those adults to choose the
location of the child’s residence from among all areas the state has zoned
as residential, does a child end up living in a particular place.
Because the state typically does all this without explicit reference to
children’s residential location, and because the territory left open to parents for residential choice is typically so extensive, we tend to be oblivious
to the state’s role. It would be more apparent if the state simply added
language such as “for children as well as adults” to zoning laws designating land as residential, or if a particular local government shrank the area
zoned for residential use to only horrible locations, or if state statutes
stated explicitly: “The state hereby authorizes legal parents to choose horrible neighborhoods for their child’s residence.” Parents’ volition obviously plays a role as well, but a given adult’s preference as to where a given
child should live is effective only if and because the state makes that adult
the legal parent and custodian of that child and empowers legal parents to
choose where the child will live. That is obvious in the case of adoptive
parenting, and it is no less true in the case of parenting by biological parents. Absent that state action, birth parents would be in no better position
than any other adult who wished to take possession of a child. Depending
on how one interprets certain other legal rules (e.g., prohibitions on kidnapping), in the absence of parentage laws either any adult or no adult
could lawfully take possession of a child at any time.
Though zoning laws today do not distinguish between residential use
for children and residential use for adults, one of the rationales local governments have given historically for segregating residential and nonresidential uses, against objections based on property rights, was concern
for the health of children in particular.39 In making decisions today about,
for example, how close to a factory they should permit people to live,
regulators are likely to consider the enhanced danger to children of, for
example, inhaling toxic particles, because childhood is a crucial time for
development of important human organs such as the lungs and the brain. If
they do ever consider the possibility of allowing only adults to live in certain places, such as areas with high air pollution levels, regulators might
conclude that such a restriction would be too difficult to administer—in
particular, because adults who have settled into an area without children
might subsequently conceive a child. In contrast, it is much more admini-

39.

See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391 (1926).
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strable to exclude children from casual use of particular spaces deemed
unsuitable for them, such as casinos, and the state generally does so.40
There is no assumption here, therefore, that land use planners and
business regulators are oblivious to the impact environment can have on
children’s well-being. But most likely state actors simply have not given
much thought to the possibility of excluding just children from a neighborhood on the basis of its social environment, and so have also not considered whether problems of administrability in that context might be outweighed by other considerations. It might well be that the child welfare
gain resulting from a “no-child policy” in particular blighted areas outweighs the costs of administering the policy, and that a no-child policy is
preferable to simply excluding all persons from residing there, because the
basic aim is to separate children from a certain group of adults and a certain social milieu. I discuss these possibilities in Part III.
B. Domestic Relations and Child Protection Laws That
Determine Children’s Residences
The legal rules that now govern formation, regulation, and dissolution
of parent-child relationships are for the most part indifferent to community
environment. Explicit direction to state decision makers to take into account the larger social and physical environment in which a child would
live is largely confined to the context of qualifying applicants for adoption,
and even with respect to that context one finds such direction only in a
minority of states.
1. Parentage
Parentage rules include maternity and paternity rules that assign initial
legal parenthood with respect to newborn children as well as adoption
rules that assign legal parenthood to a new parent or set of parents.

40.
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27:260(A)(2) (2009) (“A person under the age of twentyone shall not . . . [l]oiter, or be permitted to loiter, in or about any room, premises, or designated
gaming area wherein any licensed game is operated or conducted.”); W. VA. CODE § 29-25-24(a)(2)
(2008) (the language of which will be amended per 2009 W. Va. Act No. 106 and read: “An individual may enter a designated gaming area or remain in a designated gaming area only if the individual: . . .
Is at least twenty-one years of age.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 273f (2008) (“Any person, . . . and any
firm or corporation, who as employer or otherwise, shall send, direct, or cause to be sent or directed
to any saloon, gambling house, house of prostitution, or other immoral place, any minor, is guilty of a
misdemeanor.”); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25665 (2008) (“Any licensee under an on-sale license
issued for public premises . . . who permits a person under the age of 21 years to enter and remain in
the licensed premises without lawful business therein is guilty of a misdemeanor.”).
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a. Maternity and Paternity
Maternity rules throughout the United States assign initial legal motherhood to a child’s birth mother.41 The law requires no consideration of
maternal fitness in any case, let alone consideration of the environment in
which the birth mother lives.42 Thus, even a birth mother who is a heroin
addict and prostitute living on the streets in a crime-ridden and druginfested neighborhood automatically becomes the first legal mother of any
child to whom she gives birth.43 That legal status entails a presumptive
right to custody of the child, and terminating that legal status is typically
quite difficult.44
Paternity rules likewise generally predicate initial legal parenthood
solely on biological connection.45 States sometimes apply legal presumptions of biological paternity, such as a man’s being married to the birth
mother, without requiring genetic testing, but in those cases they generally
permit any other man claiming to be the biological father to demand genetic testing and to become the legal father upon demonstrating by such testing that he is the child’s biological father, regardless of his fitness to participate in raising a child or his living situation.46 Presumed fathers might
become unable at some point to exit the legal father-child relationship even
if they can prove that they are not the biological father of a child,47 but
they will not be excluded from legal parenthood based on unfitness or living in a dangerous environment. Only in a few instances have courts denied paternity to a man on grounds of relative capacity to parent, those
rare cases when each of two men has had a presumption of paternity in his
favor and state statutes instructed courts to choose between the two based

41.
See James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children’s Existing Rights in State Decision Making
About Their Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 845, 859 (2003).
42.
Id. at 859–60. For an argument that this state practice violates the constitutional rights of
newborn babies, see James G. Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright: The State, Parentage, and the
Rights of Newborn Persons, 56 UCLA L. REV. 755 (2009).
43.
In such a case, a child protection agency would likely take the child into custody if it became
aware of the child (and there is a substantial likelihood that it would not), but the birth mother’s legal
parent status would cause the child to incur a year or more of foster care and possibly many years of a
cycle of removal from and return to the custody of the birth mother. For a description of the state’s
current, terribly inadequate response to birth parent unfitness, see James G. Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States’ Continued Consignment of Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, 93 MINN. L. REV.
407 (2008).
44.
See Dwyer, supra note 41, at 952–66.
45.
See id. at 865–81.
46.
See id. at 868–71.
47.
See, e.g., Weidman v. Weidman, 808 A.2d 576 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002), appeal denied, 816
A.2d 1103 (Pa. 2003) (holding that former husband was estopped from contesting his paternity as to
child he always knew was not his biological offspring because of his extensive involvement in the
child’s life during marriage); Parker v. Parker, 950 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 2007) (holding that former husband
was barred by statute of limitations from contesting paternity on grounds of ex-wife having defrauded
him).
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on “policy” considerations. In those cases, the courts have given no consideration to the community in which the men lived.48
b. Adoption
A child can enter into a new parent-child relationship through adoption. Adoption typically effectuates a termination of at least one prior parent’s rights as well as investing legal parent status in new parents.49 Stepparent adoption terminates the legal parent status of just the initial parent
other than the one to whom the adopter is married.50 “New family” or
“stranger” adoption typically terminates the rights of both initial legal parents, if the state has not already terminated the initial parents’ rights in a
child protection proceeding.51 Subpart 5 below presents standards for terminating parental rights in adoption and child protection proceedings. This
Subpart focuses on rules for qualifying persons to become adoptive parents.
Rules for adoption and treatment of applicants for adoption are in
many ways revealing of what the legal regime for parenthood more generally might be if not for entrenched notions of biological-parent entitlement.
What the state does in an adoption is functionally equivalent to what it
does through paternity and maternity laws—namely, creating a legal parent-child relationship with presumptive custody reposed in the parent, and
thereby assigning children to a family.52 Yet the rules governing adoption,
unlike the rules for paternity and maternity, come very close to adhering
to a child-centered ideal.53 They require a detailed examination of persons
who wish to become parents, and they require that courts confer legal parent status on an adult only when that is in the best interests of the child,
which in theory entails a comparison with available alternative potential
parents.54
In this realm, where the potential parents are not viewed as having a
natural right to raise a child, state scrutiny is relatively rigorous. However, even here, in most states the law reflects no consideration of potential
48.
See Dwyer, supra note 41, at 874–75.
49.
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-18(b) (2010).
50.
See Dwyer, supra note 41, at 904–06.
51.
Id. at 884–85.
52.
See id. at 882–83.
53.
For an extensive theoretical analysis of what constitutes a child-centered ideal of state decision
making about children’s family relationships, see JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF
CHILDREN (2006).
54.
Dwyer, supra note 41, at 881–906. In step-parent adoption cases, the comparison is between
the applicant and the existing legal parent whose parental status would be extinguished by the adoption. In new-family adoptions, the comparison in practice is often just a discrimination between applicants who pass some quality threshold and those who do not, though in many cases adoption agencies
try to find the best match for a child, in light of the child’s particular needs and the capacities and
circumstances of particular adoption applicants.
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parents’ community environment. Statutory rules for court approval of an
adoption are typically minimalist, stating simply that a court find that the
adoption is in the best interests of the child and/or that the applicants are
suitable parents, taking into account any assessment of the applicants that
has been done.55 Some states’ statutes dictate in some detail what a court
must find in order to approve adoption, but the focus is entirely on the
applicants’ personal qualities and home. For example, Colorado’s adoption
law requires a court to be “satisfied” as to “[t]he good moral character,
the ability to support and educate the child, and the suitableness of the
home of the person adopting such child,” as well as “[t]he criminal
records check of the prospective adoptive parent.”56 Similarly, Kansas’s
adoption statutes authorize court approval of an adoption on the basis of an
agency assessment and direct that, in conducting the assessment, the agency “is authorized to observe the child in the petitioner’s home, verify financial information of the petitioner, . . . clear the name of the petitioner
with the child abuse and neglect registry . . . , [and] determine whether
the petitioner has been convicted of a felony.”57 Maine’s adoption statute
appears affirmatively to limit the court’s and adoption agency’s focus to
parental characteristics by presenting a seemingly exclusive list of relevant
considerations:

55.
See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 578-8(a) (2010) (“[T]he court may enter a decree of adoption if
it is satisfied (1) that the individual is adoptable . . . , (2) that the individual is physically, mentally,
and otherwise suitable for adoption by the petitioners, (3) that the petitioners are fit and proper persons
and financially able to give the individual a proper home and education, if the individual is a child, and
(4) that the adoption will be for the best interests of the individual . . . .”); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 578-8(b) (“Before entering the decree, the court shall notify the director of human services of the
pendency of such petition for adoption and allow a reasonable time for the director to make such
investigation as the director may deem proper as to the fitness of the petitioners to adopt the individual, . . . and as to whether the best interest of the individual will be subserved by the adoption . . . .”);
see also ALA. CODE § 26-10A-25(b) (2009); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.23.120 (2010); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 8-116(A) (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-214 (2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13
§ 915(a) (2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.142(4) (2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-18(b), (d) (2010);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1507 (2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-11-1(a), (c) (2008); LA. CHILD.
CODE ANN. art. 1217, 1239 (2004); MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-3A-34 (a) (2006); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 210, § 6 (2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.57(a) (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 127.150 (2010); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 114 (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-2-603(a) (2009);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.350 (2003).
56.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-5-210 (2005).
57.
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2132(e) (2005); see also MONT. CODE ANN., § 42-4-201(1)
(2004) (directing consideration of “(a) age, as it relates to health, earning capacity, provisions for the
support of a child, or other relevant circumstances; (b) marital status, as it relates to the ability to
serve as a parent in particularized circumstances; and (c) religion, as it relates to the ability to provide
the child with an opportunity for religious or spiritual and ethical development”); MONT. CODE ANN.,
§ 42-5-107(2) (providing that in contested adoption cases, the court should consider the nature of the
child’s relationship with the various parties and the child’s need for continuity); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 32A-5-36 (1991) (likewise directing courts to examine the nature of the relationship the child has
formed with adoptive parents after initial placement); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2535(b) (2010)
(directing pre-adoption investigation to include “adopting parents’ age, sex, health and racial, ethnic
and religious background”).
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In determining the best interests of the adoptee, the court shall
consider and evaluate the following factors to give the adoptee a
permanent home at the earliest possible date: 1) The love, affection and other emotional ties existing between the adoptee and the
adopting person or persons, the biological parent or biological
parents or the putative father; 2) The capacity and disposition of
the adopting person or persons, the biological parent or biological
parents or the putative father to educate and give the adoptee love,
affection and guidance and to meet the needs of the adoptee . . . ;
and 3) The capacity and disposition of the adopting person or persons, the biological parent or biological parents or the putative father to provide the adoptee with food, clothing and other material
needs, education, permanence and medical care . . . .58
At the level of agency regulation, administrative codes are generally
much more detailed.59 In some states, regulations do direct social workers
conducting home studies to take into account the quality of an adoption
applicant’s community. For example, New Jersey’s administrative code
directs adoption agencies to “obtain information on the applicants” that
includes “[l]ocation and description of physical environment of the residence and neighborhood.”60 In most states, though, the focus of administrative code directions to social workers conducting home studies is likewise limited to applicants’ personal characteristics and home environments.61 In those states, local agencies might develop their own checklists
58.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A § 9-308(B) (1998).
59.
See Dwyer, supra note 41, at 885–88.
60.
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10:121A-5.6 (2011); see also FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R.
§ 65C-16.005 (3)(h) (2011) (“Housing and neighborhoods must provide adequate space and the living
conditions necessary to promote the health and safety of the family.”); GA. COMP. R. & REGS.
290-9-2-.06 (2009) (prescribing investigation of “home and community,” including “[d]escription of
the neighborhood” and “[a]ssessment of community resources, including accessibility of schools,
religious institutions, recreation, and medical facilities”); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 67 § 5101 (2008)
(stipulating than an “application for court approval of adoptive placement . . . shall contain” a statement about the applicants as to “the adequacy of the physical environment of their home and neighborhood”); N.M. CODE R. § 8.26.3.18 (“physical and social home environment and neighborhood
environment”). In Indiana, court rules require that a pre-placement adoption investigation include a
“physical description or neighborhood, house, housekeeping standards, etc.” Ind. Vanderburgh Sup.
Ct. L.P.R. R. 13.
61.
See, e.g., ALA. ADMIN. CODE R. § 660-5-22-.04(f)(1) (2009); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22,
§ 35181 (West 2009); IOWA ADMIN. CODE R. 441-200.4(600) (2009); 922 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:030
(2009); ME. CODE R. § 10-148 Ch. 19. Add. § 2 (Lexis Nexis 2011) (listing as a criterion “the adequacy of the physical plant (home and immediate grounds)”); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18,
§ 421.16 (2009); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5101:2-48-12 (2009); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 340:75-15-87
(2009); OR. ADMIN. R. § 413-120-0310 (2009); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 0250-4-9-.09 (2009);
UTAH ADMIN. CODE R. 512-40 (2009); 22 VA. ADMIN. CODE §40-280-20(B)(7) (directing study of
“[h]ome and community environment,” identifying as components of this study only “[t]he degree to
which the home environment allows for privacy among family members; adequate play areas; and
freedom from health and safety hazards . . . [and t]he accessibility of community resources that may
be needed for the child”).
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for home studies and those might include consideration of neighborhood
quality, but it is unclear to what extent that occurs.62 And it is uncertain
how courts would treat information about a neighborhood in the absence
of statutory direction to consider it; applicants might well complain if
precluded from adoption solely or principally on the basis of a consideration not set forth in state statutes or regulations. Reported decisions of
courts disqualifying applicants from adoption are fairly rare. Among those
that exist, none make mention of the applicants’ neighborhoods or communities; the courts have focused entirely on the characteristics of the applicants—most often, race or religion (because of race- or religionmatching policies), age, or sexual orientation—and the quality of the home
environment.63
One might assume that applicants for adoption of a biologically unrelated child are generally relatively affluent because such adoptions are
usually quite costly for the applicants and thus their neighborhoods are
rarely a concern. If that is true, then legislative and judicial silence about
community quality should not be surprising. This is not to suggest that
affluent neighborhoods are all trouble free, but, as shown in Part I, seriously adverse neighborhood effects typically occur in residential areas
marked by chronic and pervasive poverty. Many applicants for adoption,
however, are relatives of the birth parents, and many such applicants are
relatively poor.64 Yet the few reported decisions of courts or agencies denying applications for adoption by such relatives focus only on the characteristics and homes of the applicants, not mentioning neighborhood quali-

62.
The only example I have been able to identify is in Washington State. See WASHINGTON
STATE DEP’T OF SOC. & HEALTH SERVS., CHILDREN’S ADMIN., FAMILY HOME STUDY, available at
http:// www1. dshs. wa. gov/ pdf/m s/forms/ 10_043. pdf. A national clearinghouse for information
about adoption suggests that this is typical of home study checklists nationwide but cites no evidence of
this. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, THE
ADOPTION HOME STUDY PROCESS, available at http:// www. childwelfare. gov/ pubs/ f_homstu .cfm.
63.
See Lofton v. Sec’y of Dept. of Children & Family, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004)
(rejecting challenge to state’s refusing to allow homosexuals to adopt); In re Jones, Nos. 99-CA-65,
66, 67, 68, 69 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 5504 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 15, 1999); Drummond v. Fulton
Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Serv., 547 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1977); In re Adoption of Victor
Lamont Haven, No. C-780343 1979 Ohio App. LEXIS 9744 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 1, 1979); In re
Adoption of Michelle T., 44 Cal. App. 3d 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975); In re Adoption of A Minor, 228
F.2d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1955); In re Farrar, 635 So. 2d 674 (La. Ct. App. 1994); Dickens v. Ernesto, 30
N.Y.2d 61 (N.Y. 1972); In re J.D.W., 711 A.2d 826 (D.C. 1998); In re Petition of Niskanen, 223
N.W.2d 754 (Minn. 1974); In re D.L., 479 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. 1992); In re M.F. v. D.A.H., 1
S.W.3d 524 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999); In re Adoption of Riffle, Nos. DA-93-7, 94-2 1996 Mont. Dist.
LEXIS 594 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Jan. 17, 1996); Avery v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs. (In re Adoption
of B.T.), 78 P.3d 634 (Wash. 2003); In re Petition of Schomer, 411 N.E.2d 554 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980);
In re Woodruff, No. 1125 1984 Ohio App. LEXIS 12277 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1984); O’Rourke
v. Kirby, 429 N.E.2d 85 (N.Y. 1981).
64.
WILLIAM P. STATSKY, FAMILY LAW: THE ESSENTIALS 290 (2d ed. 2004) (forty-two percent
of U.S. adoptions in 1992 were stepparent or relative adoptions).
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ty.65 This might suggest that courts ignore or under-emphasize community
environment in many adoption cases.
Ironically, several states’ statutes direct child welfare agencies seeking
adoptive homes for a child following termination of initial parents’ legal
right to look for a placement within the same neighborhood.66 Though this
might afford such children some stability in the sense of continuing to live
in a familiar environment, the concentration of child maltreatment in dysfunctional communities suggests that, more often than not, the child would
be much better off if entirely removed from the initial parents’ community
after severance of the parent-child relationship.
2. Awarding Custody After Parental Separation
Courts adjudicate custody disputes between legal parents following paternity determinations and following marital separations or dissolutions.
For both circumstances, the rules are the same.67 Like adoption rules,
rules governing child custody disputes are especially child-focused, among
all the legal rules affecting children’s lives. In the adoption realm, the
explanation is likely that adoption applicants are not viewed as having any
natural rights to parent.68 In the realm of custody disputes between two
legal parents, it is likely that the competing parties both are viewed as
having natural rights to parent, and thus cancel each other out.69 The childfocused nature of custody decision making is manifest in the near universality of an over-arching “best interests of the child” standard of decision.70 Yet in this area as well, a pervasive absence of reference to the
parents’ surrounding community suggests a reluctance to make a parent’s
larger environment count for or against them, perhaps because it is seen as
a proxy for affluence and lawmakers believe parents should not suffer for

65.
See note 74, infra.
66.
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.136 (b)(iii) (2004) (governing permanent placement for a child whether adoption, foster care, with relatives or with parent/guardian) (“A child shall
be placed as close to the child’s home as possible, preferably in the child’s own neighborhood, unless
the court finds that placement at a greater distance is necessary to promote the child’s or parents’ wellbeing”); OR. ADMIN. R. 413-110-0340 (2) (2010) (“In the case of a child for whom the permanency
plan is adoption, the worker must document in the permanency plan . . . efforts to identify potential
adoptive families from the neighborhood and community in which the child resides.”).
67.
See Dwyer, supra note 41, at 907.
68.
See, e.g., Lofton, 358 F.3d at 809; In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 665–66 (Mich. 1993)
(drawing a distinction between natural entitlement of biological father and lack thereof on part of
would-be adoptive parents); Lindley ex rel. Lindley v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124, 130–31 (7th Cir. 1989)
(“Because of its statutory basis, adoption differs from natural procreation in a most important and
striking way.”).
69.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.301(1) (West 2010) (“The mother and father jointly are natural guardians of their own children and of their adopted children, during minority.”); Dwyer, supra note 41,
at 910.
70.
Dwyer, supra note 41, at 907–910.
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being less affluent, or perhaps because lawmakers believe parents should
not suffer because other persons create a bad environment around them.
Child custody statutes, in addition to announcing a general “best interests” standard, typically provide a list of specific factors that courts should
consider in deciding what custody and visitation arrangement is best for a
child.71 Many direct courts to consider a child’s “adjustment to” or ties to
the community in which he or she has lived,72 but none direct courts to
compare the relative quality of the neighborhoods that the two parents
inhabit. Consideration of this factor could include community characteristics that cause a child to be not well adjusted to living there, but the idea
behind this factor appears to be a concern for stability, not wanting to remove children from an environment to which they are accustomed; it is
not concern for adverse community conditions, even though in some cases
such conditions might as a factual matter outweigh the benefits of stability.
Uniformly, these statutes also indicate that courts may consider any other
factor they deem relevant—that is, that the specified factors are nonexclusive,73 and under such a catch-all provision, courts could consider
each parent’s neighborhood. But one rarely sees any reference to neighborhood or community in reported custody decisions. At most there is
discussion of the relative quality of the schools in the two parents’ locations,74 which can serve to some degree as a proxy for, or indicator of,
neighborhood quality, but certainly not a perfect proxy. In fact, appellate
courts generally reject relative affluence as an appropriate direct consideration, reflecting feminist concerns that doing so would systematically disfavor mothers who had sacrificed employment prospects to care for children,75 and affluence is so closely connected to residential location that trial
level courts might understand this to mean they should not count against a
parent that he or she lives in a community with problems tied to poverty.

71.
Id. at 916–17.
72.
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-403(A)(4) (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56(c)(9)
(2009); D.C. CODE § 16-914(a)(3)(D) (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717(1)(d) (2006); MO. REV.
STAT. § 452.375.2(5) (2003).
73.
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-403(A)(4) (2007); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c)(9) (2010);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717(1) (2006) (“The court shall consider all relevant factors”); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46b-56(c) (2009); MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375.2 (2003).
74.
See, e.g., D’Ambrosio v. Fowler, No. 0494-07-4, 2008 WL 423885, at *2 (Va. Ct. App.
Feb. 19, 2008).
75.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 872 So. 2d 92, 95 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) (“This Court is not
aware of any authority for the proposition that the parent earning a greater income is entitled to some
preference in a custody dispute based solely on that consideration.”). But cf. Patel v. Patel, 599
S.E.2d 114, 121–22 (S.C. 2004) (declining to take into account a son´s expressed preference to live
with his father, because it appeared to be based on a positive attitude toward living in California rather
than South Carolina rather than toward living with father per se).
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3. Removing Children from Parental Custody
Child protection intervention is predominantly reactive to harm that
has already occurred to children, and rarely proactive in protecting children at high risk so that they never suffer harm.76 Certainly child protective
services (“CPS”) agencies never assume custody of children simply because a parent is living in a horrible neighborhood. CPS might take custody if parents are homeless and locate themselves and their children in very
unsuitable places, such as a city sidewalk or under a bridge, treating that
as neglect on the part of the parents, at least if decent shelters for homeless families are available.77 More likely, they will induce the parents to
stay with the child in a public or publicly subsidized facility.78 And if the
parents live in a house or apartment, CPS will not remove a child or intervene in any other way simply because the parent is living in a neighborhood where life outside the house or apartment is extremely hazardous for
a child. State statutory and administrative rules for removal generally dictate that removal is proper if and only if the parent, immediate home environment, or both substantially threaten a child’s safety and there is no reasonable alternative intervention that would obviate the threat.79 Yet children do not live exclusively within their parents’ house or apartment; they
inevitably spend much of their time outside the family home and their
quality of life depends very much on the larger social environment.
When CPS does receive a report because a child has been abused or
neglected, or is endangered by something other than just the neighborhood, such as parental drug use in the home, does it consider in its investigation the quality of the neighborhood in which parent and child live? A
typical agency checklist for assessing a child’s safety includes reference to
violence and drug use by parents or others in the household where a child
lives, but not violence and drug use by persons outside the household.80 It
includes dangers to the child’s health or safety within the home, such as
exposed electrical wires or weapons within a child’s reach, but generally
not dangers to health and safety just outside the door of the child’s home
or apartment.81 It also includes reference to a parent’s inability or unwillingness to protect a child from harm inflicted by others within the houseSee Dwyer, supra note 41, at 952–66.
See, e.g., MICH. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS, CFP 713–1, CPS INVESTIGATION–GENERAL
INSTRUCTIONS AND CHECKLIST (2008) available at http:// www. mfia. state.mi. us/olmweb/ ex/PSM/
713-1. pdf at 9 (listing lack of housing or temporary shelter as a factor in agency decision to take a
child into custody) [hereinafter “MICHIGAN CPS MANUAL”].
78.
See id. at 12.
79.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-306 (2006); CAL. WELF. & INST CODE § 361 (West 2008); NY
FAMILY CT. ACT § 1027 (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1517 (2007); MINN. ADMIN. R. 9560.0221
(2007).
80.
See, e.g., MICHIGAN CPS MANUAL, supra note 77, at 5–6, 9–10.
81.
See, e.g., id. at 9.
76.
77.
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hold, and to a parent’s allowing a young child to wander alone outside the
home, but not to a parent’s inability to protect a child outside the home
because the community is simply extraordinarily dangerous.82 CPS rules
will encourage social workers to look at the surrounding community as a
potential source of assistance,83 but not as a liability or source of dange to
the child. And they will authorize agency workers to urge a non-abusive
parent to relocate in order to get the child away from an abusive parent,
but not in order to get out of a bad neighborhood (though undoubtedly
some agency workers sometimes do this).84 Some agencies use diagnostic
tools aimed at gauging the likelihood of future abuse, looking for “stressors” that could cause a parent to act impulsively rather than thoughtfully
in disciplining a child, but remarkably these tools generally do not include
residence in a dangerous, crime-ridden neighborhood as a stressor.85
Of course, in practice, in neglect cases predicated in whole or part on
lack of supervision, child protection workers are likely to gauge the danger to a child posed by being unsupervised based in part on the relative
safety of the neighborhood. A parent who allows a child to play outside
the home unsupervised in a suburban subdivision where there is very little
crime and other parents are outside and able to help with monitoring is
unlikely to be charged with neglect. In contrast, although child protection
workers are not likely to monitor parental supervision in the nation’s worst
neighborhoods, most likely if asked they would agree that a parent in such
a neighborhood would be neglectful ever to leave a young child unsupervised anywhere outside the home, even in the hallway of their apartment
building. Yet the law and agency policies in most jurisdictions do not explicitly direct CPS workers to make the surrounding neighborhood a factor
in their assessment of danger to a child.

82.
See, e.g., id. at 7–8.
83.
See, e.g., id. at 5 (agency worker assessing child’s situation shall “consider the resources
available in the family and the community that might help to keep the child safe”).
84.
See, e.g., id. at 12. There are multiple CPS investigation guides and checklists that are similar
to the Michigan CPS Manual. See N.C. FAM. SUPPORT & CHILD WELFARE SERVS., N.C. SAFETY
ASSESSMENT (2005), available at http://info.dhhs.state.nc.us/olm/forms/dss/dss-5231.pdf; R.I. DEP’T
OF CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, 500.0010, CRITERIA FOR A CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVS.
INVESTIGATION (2006), available at http://www.dcyf.state.ri.us/docs/cps_criteria_final.pdf; VA.
DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS.: CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVS., VOL. VII, SECTION III, CHAPTER A, APPENDIX:
ADDITIONAL GUIDELINES OR SUGGESTED PRACTICES, PART IV: FAMILY ASSESSMENT AND
INVESTIGATION (2008), available at http:// www. dss. virginia. gov/f iles/ division/ dfs/ cps/intro
_page /manuals/ 07-2008/ appendix_ part_4 .pdf.
85.
See, e.g., OR. STATE OFFICE FOR SERVS. TO CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT RISK FACTOR CHECKLIST, available at http:// dhsforms. hr.state. or.us/Forms/
Served/CE0955A. pdf; N.C. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., SDM FAMILY RISK ASSESSMENT OF
ABUSE/NEGLECT POLICY AND PROCEDURES (2009), available at http:// info. dhhs. state. nc.us/ olm/
forms/ dss/dss-5 230-ia .pdf.
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4. Returning a Child to Parental Custody
State law rules for returning a child to parental custody following a
child protective removal typically call simply for evidence that parents
have followed steps outlined by CPS designed to eliminate the conditions
in the home that previously were found to endanger the child.86 Those
steps might include keeping certain people out of the home, such as an
abusive boyfriend or a drug supplier,87 but they appear never to include
moving out of a given neighborhood. One state, Colorado, does require
case workers to take into account the neighborhood environment in assessing whether return to parental custody would be safe for a child.88 Simply
considering the neighborhood in assessing danger to the child does create
an incentive for parents to move out of a dysfunctional community. But
CPS agencies generally do not make relocation per se a condition for return of a child, even though neighborhood conditions might be a partial
cause of the parent’s inability to care properly for the child.
5. Termination of Parental Rights
Courts terminate legal parent-child relationships in child protective
proceedings and in adoption proceedings. The former generally occurs
only after a finding that a parent has engaged in serious maltreatment and
after a period of at least a year during which the state retains custody of a
child and CPS workers attempt to “rehabilitate” the parents.89 Courts generally terminate parental rights when a parent fails to become rehabili86.
See, e.g., CAL.WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.22 (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46b-129 (2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.522 (West 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:23(III)
(2010) (“Upon showing the ability to provide proper parental care, it shall be presumed that a return of
custody is in the child’s best interests.”); UTAH ADMIN. CODE R. 512-301-6 (2011); OR. ADMIN. R.
41-040-0017 (2009); In re Chicase, 2008 WL 1849690, at *10–11 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (denying a
parent’s request for reunification, because of parent’s failure to follow CPS plan).
87.
See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 587-53(f)(1) (2010); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22 § 4036(1)(F-1)
(2004); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.1015 (West 2008); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.063(1) (2005);
In re T.N., 180 S.W.3d 376, 383–86 (Tex. App.) (upholding termination of parental rights based in part
on mother’s continued contact with and exposure of her children to her drug supplier); In re A.H., 751
N.E.2d 690, 700 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding order that father who sexually abused child stay away
from the home). For an overview of the topic and a persuasive argument for doing this more often, see
Robin Fretwell Wilson, Removing Violent Parents From the Home: A Test Case for the Public Health
Approach, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 638 (2005).
88.
See, e.g., COLO. CODE REGS. § 2509-4, 7.301.1(B)(3) (2007) (“The following information
shall be included in the assessment documented in the Family Services Plan: . . . Family environment
and overall functioning, including physical environment of the housing/neighborhood, family composition, stability, stresses, parenting skills, discipline methods and relationships.”).
89.
See Dwyer, supra note 41, at 954–63; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-319 (2006); ARK. CODE
ANN § 9-27-341(2010); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §19-3-604 (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§45a-717 (2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §1103 (West 2009); FL. STAT. ANN. §39.806 (West
2010); GA. CODE. ANN., §15-11-94 (West 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. §600A.8 (West 2001); KAN. STAT.
ANN. 38-2269 (West 2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090 (West 2010); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art
1015 (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. § 4055 (2004).
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tated, and they determine that it would not be safe for the child to return
home then or within a reasonable period of time.90 As suggested by the
rule for return to parental custody, the legal system rarely or never requires parents to relocate as a condition for return of a child, and it is never an explicit consideration in a termination case that parents live in a
neighborhood that presents dangers to the child’s welfare. The focus is on
parental characteristics and parental efforts to correct behavior and improve a bad home situation.91 This can include evidence that parents remain unable or unwilling to supervise a child outside the home, but it never includes a parent’s failure to move out of a neighborhood that is unsuitable for children.
Courts also effect an involuntary termination of parental rights in
adoption proceedings when a legal parent refuses to consent to the adoption.92 Grounds for terminating parental rights in this context also focus on
parental conduct, principally whether the parent objecting to the adoption
has maintained contact with and given support to the child.93 A few states
authorize adoption over the objection of a birth parent when the parent’s
refusal to consent to the adoption is “unreasonable” or contrary to the best
interests of the child.94 In theory, a court in such a state could take into
account where a parent lives in deciding that the parent is withholding
consent unreasonably. But only in rare cases have courts applied a bestinterest basis for waiving parental consent to adoption, and in doing so
they have focused exclusively on attributes of the parents, not at all on the
parents’ community.95
6. Summary
On the whole, legal rules governing children’s relational lives are indifferent to the quality of life in communities where parents or potential
parents live. There is some indication of its consideration in the context of
adoption and, to a lesser extent, custody disputes between legal parents.
But these types of decisions are less likely to involve adults who live in
horrible neighborhoods than are the many types of state decisions that do
involve such adults—in particular, non-marital parentage cases and child
protection cases.96 Therefore, where state consideration of community
90.
See Dwyer, supra note 41, at 961.
91.
Id. at 956.
92.
Id. at 963.
93.
Id.
94.
Id. at 963 n.362.
95.
Id.
96.
See supra note 40; Elizabeth Bartholet, The Racial Disproportionality Movement in Child
Welfare: False Facts and Dangerous Directions, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 871, 910–22 (2009); Harvard Law
School Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 26, available at http:// lsr. nellco. org/ harvard_ faculty/ 26
(arguing that charges of racial bias based on racial disproportionality have not been substantiated).
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fitness is most needed, the law nevertheless makes it irrelevant. It is obviously relevant to children’s welfare where potential legal parents would
take them to live after they are born and whether the world that abusive or
neglectful parents inhabit is likely to exacerbate their inherent shortcoming
rather than help them overcome their deficiencies. Yet the law now ignores that important fact.
III. INJECTING COMMUNITY QUALITY INTO STATE DECISION MAKING
ABOUT CHILDREN’S LIVES
A child welfare legal response to the reality of neighborhood effect
would be fairly straightforward. More complicated would be overcoming
political resistance, moral objections, and constitutional challenges. This
Part describes what appropriate changes to zoning, domestic relations, and
child protection laws might look like.
A. Zoning for Child Protection
Relying on criteria discussed in Part I, including rates of violent
crime, gang activity, substance abuse, condemned properties, singleparent households, and unemployment, government at the state or local
level could identify the worst residential areas for children within its jurisdiction. A computer program with an algorithm for incorporating various
types of data as to community conditions relevant to child welfare could
generate a neighborhood quality index by census tract,97 and government
officials could readily identify those at the extreme negative end of the
scale. A legislative body could specify some objective standard or “tipping
point” at which the neighborhood quality is so low (e.g., less than ten on a
100 point scale) as to render an area categorically unsuitable for children.
It might also establish another standard (e.g., below twenty points) for
identifying areas as to which an administrative body should undertake a
more comprehensive and subjective assessment, with community input, to
determine whether the environment is so bad and timely improvement so
improbable as to justify the disruption that would result from declaring the
community unfit. Based on such judgments, the state could publicly declare particular communities unfit for child rearing and alter local zoning
laws to designate those areas adult-only residential areas.

97.
Data collection and quantitative demographic research is predominantly based on census
tracts, which are “the closest approximation to neighborhoods available in official statistics, with
populations typically ranging between 2,500 and 8,000 inhabitants and boundaries initially drawn to
construct geographic units with relatively homogeneous population characteristics, economic status,
and living conditions.” Wagmiller, supra note 28, at 166. Multi-criteria ratings of neighborhood
quality are already common. See, e.g., TURNER, POPKIN & RAWLINGS, supra note 2, at 86.

2011]

No Place for Children

915

Following such a finding and declaration, the state could take any
number of steps toward making such areas childless. Most starkly, it could
simply order that by a certain date no household in the area may contain
children, and no children may enter the area, with civil and/or criminal
penalties for any adults who do not comply. More modestly, it could set a
target date for making an unfit community childless and offer whatever
relocation assistance it reasonably can to parents currently living in the
area, while strictly enforcing a prohibition on entry of new families containing children into the area. Currently, a great number of people living
in blighted neighborhoods want to relocate to better places, and in fact in
some places litigation has been brought to require changes to or expansion
of government programs of relocation assistance, which currently fall far
short of meeting the demand.98 Thus, many parents might welcome the
rezoning if it were coupled with expansion of relocation programs or with
a change in the rules governing those programs to give parents with minor
children priority over other applicants. As discussed in Part IV, courts
might order state and local governments that impose no-child zoning to
provide adequate relocation assistance to all affected parents, were advocates for such parents to mount a constitutional challenge to the rezoning.
But there would also be some parents who would prefer not to move.
Though the idea of making entire neighborhoods childless for child
welfare reasons is novel, it is analogous to many things governments already do without much controversy. Governments already routinely make
judgments about the suitability of particular spaces for habitation by any
humans, when they zone areas for industrial use only, when they condemn
individual buildings, and when they declare some neighborhoods
“blighted” for urban renewal grant purposes.99 Many states’ definitions of
98.
See, e.g., TURNER, POPKIN & RAWLINGS, supra note 2, at 87 (noting that some applicants for
housing vouchers must wait years); Philip D. Tegeler, The Persistence of Segregation in Government
Housing Programs, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN
METROPOLITAN AMERICA, supra note 2, at 210–11 (noting that demand for relocation assistance
currently far exceeds supply); Bob Shaw, The War Over Affordable Housing, ST. PAUL PIONEER
PRESS, June 28, 2008 (discussing relocation in the Chicago area); Eric Siegel, U.S. Judge is Asked to
Order Housing for Poor in Suburbs, THE BALT. SUN, Mar. 21, 2006 (discussing litigation over housing subsidy programs in Baltimore).
99.
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-931 (2009) (“It has been and is continuing to be the policy
of the Commonwealth to authorize each locality . . . to prevent blight and other environmental degradation . . . .”); VA. CODE ANN. § 36-49 (2009) (providing provisions for the adoption of redevelopment plans to address blighted areas); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1701-1719.2 (2008) (Pennsylvania’s
Urban Redevelopment Law, the purpose of which is the clearance, reconstruction, and rehabilitation
of blighted areas); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:12A-5 (West 2009) (authorizing evacuation of persons
from areas deemed in need of redevelopment, identified on the basis of considerations such as: “The
generality of buildings are substandard, unsafe, unsanitary, dilapidated, or obsolescent, or possess any
of such characteristics, or are so lacking in light, air, or space, as to be conducive to unwholesome
living or working conditions,” “[t]he discontinuance of the use of buildings previously used for commercial, manufacturing, or industrial purposes; the abandonment of such buildings; or the same being
allowed to fall into so great a state of disrepair as to be untenantable,” [and a]reas with buildings or
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“blight” include an unhealthy social environment—in particular, chronic
criminal activity.100 The state also routinely makes judgments about the
suitability of particular spaces for habitation by children specifically when
they declare households unfit for children and make them childless
through child protection proceedings. This analogue is significant from a
conceptual and moral standpoint because when a court orders removal of
all children from a household but imposes no restrictions on which adults
live there, it might be viewed as implicitly finding that some places are
adequate for adult habitation but not for children to live in. Yet the practice of removing just children from a home is well established and widely
accepted. The practice of excluding just children from public space in particular areas is also common; many jurisdictions today have juvenile curfews, prohibiting minors from being out of doors at night.101 Such discriminations are readily understood as reflecting differences between children
and adults in vulnerability to, and capacity to avoid, dangers in the environment.
Further, the state now exerts substantial coercion on adults with respect to their residential choices, in some ways for the sake of protecting
children. As noted in Part II, sometimes parents can avoid losing custody
of their children in child protection proceedings, or can regain custody,
only by changing their residence, even if relocation is not an explicit condition for having custody. And numerous laws severely restrict the residential choices of convicted sex offenders.102 In addition, for the benefit of
the general public, many localities prohibit people who own no property
interests (i.e., homeless people) from sleeping or otherwise establishing
residences on publicly-owned properties;103 occasionally governments quarantine people to prevent the spread of disease;104 and governments at
every level force some convicted criminals to live in one particular place—
namely, a jail—for extended periods of time.
improvements which, by reason of dilapidation, obsolescence, overcrowding, faulty arrangement or
design, lack of ventilation, light and sanitary facilities, excessive land coverage, deleterious land use
or obsolete layout, or any combination of these or other factors, are detrimental to the safety, health,
morals, or welfare of the community."). Cf. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 473 (2005)
(addressing takings of property following state’s declaration that New London was a “distressed municipality”).
100.
See e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 160A-503(a) (2010) (defining “blighted parcel” to include
properties whose existence contributes to juvenile delinquency and crime or is “detrimental to the
public health, safety, morals, or welfare”); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1(1) (defining blight by reference
to conditions that include repeated illegal activity and being “conducive to ill health, transmission of
disease, infant mortality, or crime”); ALA. CODE § 24-2-1 (2006).
101.
See Note, Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion Over Minor Rights, 118 HARV. L. REV.
2400 (2005).
102.
See Timothy Zick, Constitutional Displacement, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 515, 520–21, 569–72
(2009); Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Collectivism and Ex-Offender Residence Exclusion Laws, 92
IOWA L. REV. 1, 6–12 (2006) (describing recent state and local sex offender exclusion measures).
103.
See Zick, supra note 102, at 521, 577–79.
104.
Id. at 521–22, 583–86.
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Moreover, governments also already endeavor to disperse people from
areas of concentrated poverty; the federal and some state governments
have long had various types of programs aimed at relocating people from
high-poverty, urban neighborhoods to low-poverty urban or suburban
areas, using relocation vouchers, housing subsidies, and employment assistance.105 By some accounts, these programs have had significant success, greatly improving the lives of participants, the great majority of
whom remain long-term in the lower-poverty, residential areas to which
they move.106 In some places, political resistance from receiving jurisdictions have created obstacles, but in other places families moving out of
high-poverty, inner-city neighborhoods have generally found acceptance
and assistance even in suburban neighborhoods.107 Making evacuation of
children the highest priority would put parents at the top of the list for
relocation assistance programs, which would mean whatever resources
governments do commit go toward that aim before others are addressed.
Already federal law sets aside some housing subsidy funds for use just in
facilitating reunification of children in foster care with parents whose
homes CPS had found unsuitable.108 The government might also shift some
funding currently devoted to urban renewal to child relocation because it
might justifiably have less concern about conditions in places inhabited
only by autonomous adults, who are presumed voluntarily to have chosen
to live there (a presumption I evaluate below) and to be better able than
children to guard their own welfare. It would also mean that most of the
adults moving to lower-poverty areas are single mothers with their children, whom existing residents in the receiving community might perceive
as less threatening than adult males moving from the inner city. Moreover,
after the initial evacuation period, any further relocations under a “childless neighborhood” program should involve only one newborn baby and
the parent or parents living with the baby, who are most likely to be welcomed into a new neighborhood and who are less costly to move than parents with several older children.

105.
See FROM DESPAIR TO HOPE, supra note 2; Rosenbaum et al., supra note 13, at 150–75;
Gephart, supra note 27, at 13–14. Federal law authorizing housing subsidy programs is found at 42
U.S.C. Sec. 1437f (West 2009). Cf. Federal Uniform Relocation Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4601-4655 (2006) (requiring relocation assistance to property owners and tenants when federal
agencies or state and local governments using federal money condemn properties).
106.
See Popkin & Cunningham, supra note 10, at 192–95; Rosenbaum et al., supra note 13, at
150–75.
107.
John Goering, Expanding Housing Choice and Integrating Neighborhoods: The MTO Experiment, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN
AMERICA, supra note 2, 127–49; Rosenbaum et al., supra note 13, at 150–75; Gregory Korte, Subsidized Housing Redefining Suburbia, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Sept. 14, 2008, at A1 (noting resistance
to entry of housing voucher holders in large numbers into middle-class neighborhoods).
108.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(x).
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There is also nothing novel about the concept of a childless community
or of an environment where parents may not bring children. Usually exclusion of children from residential areas is the result of private covenants
rather than of government zoning, and for the supposed benefit of those
who reside in them rather than to protect the children. There are retirement communities that by mutual covenant do not allow minor inhabitants
and housing complexes where only senior citizens can own or rent units.109
Exclusion of just children from certain non-residential areas, though, is
also common and is typically done to protect the children from an environment the state believes would be hazardous to their welfare. As noted
above, states prohibit parents from bringing children into nightclubs, casinos, and betting parlors.
The novelty of my proposal would be in its peculiar combination of
features. It would entail the government (rather than private parties by
mutual agreement) imposing the concept of an adult-only (rather than nonresidential for anyone) place on entire communities (rather than just an
individual home) for the purpose of child protection (rather than for the
benefit of people who wish not to live with children). What is novel about
the idea makes it in some ways more difficult to defend against objections
and in other ways easier to defend, as explained in Part V below.
B. Amending Domestic Relations and Child Protection Laws
In addition to, or instead of, such blanket condemnations of communities, the legal system could respond to the fact of adverse neighborhood
effect by injecting routine considerations of it into individual court decisions about particular children. Courts and agencies called upon for other
reasons, such as a post-divorce custody dispute or reported child abuse, to
decide individual cases concerning the family lives and residences of
children, could as a matter of course invite evidence about the larger environments in which particular parents live and what effects any dysfunction
in the neighborhoods has had or is likely to have on children in those loca109.
Although the federal Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination against families with children,
exceptions are made for senior citizen communities. Age-qualified communities are permitted if either
“at least 80 percent of the occupied units are occupied by at least one person who is 55 years of age or
older” or 100 percent of the residents are at least 62 years old. 42 U.S.C. § 3607. For examples of
communities that exclude children, see Christopher Caldwell, Childproof, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE,
Aug. 13, 2006, at 13; Kelly Greene & Jennifer Levitz, Retiree Havens Turn Younger to Combat the
Housing Bust, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2008, at A1; Phillip McGowan, New Housing Caters To 55-AndOlder Set, THE BALT. SUN, May 27, 2007, at A1; Bethany Sanders, Retirement Community Tries to
Evict Six-Year-Old Girl, BABBLE (Oct. 22, 2009, 10:00 A.M.), http: //blogs. babble.
com/strollerderby/ 2009/10/22/ retirement-community-tries-to-evict-six-year-old-girl/; About Brookshire, RETIRE AT BROOKSHIRE.COM, http:// www. Retireat brookshire. com/about_ brookshire. html
(last visited Jan. 28, 2010); Active Adult Living 55+ Active Lifestyle and Retirement Communities,
ACTIVE ADULT LIVING.COM, http:// www. Active adultliving.com/ new_ communities.htm (last
visited Jan. 28, 2010).
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tions. A quality-of-life rating by census tract of the sort suggested above
might simplify such assessments. Courts might even apply a very strong
presumption or absolute bar against awarding or returning custody to a
parent living in a community with a rating below a certain level, even if
the community has not yet been declared categorically unfit for children
and zoned adult-only. But even when no parent or potential parent before
an agency or court lives in a neighborhood below a specified level of minimal adequacy, the relative quality of parents’ or potential parents’
neighborhoods should factor into decisions about legal parenthood and
custody. As a factual matter, it is relevant to the empirical question of
what custodial arrangement is best for a child. Some neighborhoods might
not be so bad as to warrant strong presumptions against or categorical
prohibitions on residence by children, yet still be much less desirable places for children than other neighborhoods that are available options for
them. Consideration of this fact comes into play to some degree now in
domestic relations and child protection proceedings with older children,
when parents or agency workers express concern about a youth being or
becoming involved in illicit neighborhood activities. Legislators should
instruct courts to consider it directly and routinely and with infants as well
as older children and adolescents. State decision makers should anticipate
what problems a neighborhood environment could present for a child in
the future, just as they try to anticipate what problems parents’ personal
shortcomings could present in the future.
Taking account of the plain reality that a child’s fate can rest very
much on the nature of the community in which he or she grows up would
require, as a first step, adding “quality of neighborhood” to the list of
factors in any legal rule directing courts to determine on a case-by-case
basis what is best for a child. In most of the legal contexts discussed in
Part II, this would be a very simple and modest adjustment. As noted in
Part II, in some jurisdictions, agencies and courts already take account of
community fitness in approving applicants for adoption. Making this a
universal statutory or regulatory requirement should not be difficult for
legislatures or agencies as a drafting matter or as a political matter. In all
states, adoption or child welfare agencies already undertake a detailed
assessment of applicants for adoption or foster care, and in states where
the law does not already instruct them to consider the quality of applicants’ neighborhoods, legislatures could easily add that to the list of criteria for qualifying someone. States might spell out in some detail what specifically “home studies” should look for in assessing whether adoption or
foster care by particular applicants would be in a child’s best interests, in
light of other applicants, in terms of community characteristics.
Likewise, in allocating custody and visitation after parental separation,
in divorce or paternity proceedings, courts already, under current laws,
engage in detailed examinations of parents and their home environments in
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order to determine what results would be in children’s best interests, and it
would be a simple matter to add neighborhood quality or community fitness to the relevant considerations that state statutes list. This amendment
to custody laws might be more controversial than the amendment to adoption laws because it could have a disparate impact on mothers relative to
fathers, just as consideration of relative income would do, and I address
this concern in Part V.
In deciding whether to remove a child from parental custody, and later
whether to return such a child to parental custody, child protection agencies and courts could similarly take explicitly into account that a parent
who has been reported for child maltreatment is living in a neighborhood
that exacerbates or adds to deficiencies in parenting and home environment. Thus, a parent living in a highly dysfunctional community would be
more likely to lose custody of a child, and less likely to regain custody,
than a parent living in a healthy community who had engaged in the same
abusive or neglectful behavior. The rationale would be partly that the
overall quality of life for a child of the former parent is substantially lower
than that of a child of the latter parent, and so the former child stands in
greater need of assistance and would benefit more from removal to another
residential situation. And it would be partly that parents in a dysfunctional
community with many stressors are less likely to correct their behavior
than are parents in a community with greater social supports and fewer
stressors.
Especially after an agency and court have found parents to be abusive
or neglectful and informed them that their neighborhood environment is an
obstacle to proper care for their children, parents remaining in that neighborhood should count strongly against return of the child, at least if moving out is a realistic option for the parents. (I address in Part V the concern that it is not so for some.) At a minimum, such parents would have to
show a major transformation in their parenting capacity or home environment in order to make it in the child’s best interests, or even acceptably
safe, to return to live with them. In effect, if not explicitly, this could
amount to CPS making parental relocation a condition of return. This
would not be so different from a practice sometimes seen now, in which
CPS workers tell parents they need to get away from their drug source or
other corrupting influences if they are ever going to rehabilitate themselves personally. There are undoubtedly cases in which a parent in isolation is minimally adequate to care for a child, but who in a dysfunctional
environment cannot give the child a satisfactory quality of life, either because of the effect that the environment has on the parent or because the
parent is unable to shield the child from the dangers that the community
presents.
Lastly, in deciding whether to terminate a parent’s legal rights with
respect to a child, in a child protective proceeding or in an adoption pro-
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ceeding, courts should take into account not only what efforts parents have
made to rehabilitate themselves, or what effort a birth parent objecting to
an adoption has made to assume parental responsibilities, but also whether
the parent now lives in a safe neighborhood or has put in place strong protections against any dangerous elements in the community. Parents who
have had to work hard to overcome addictions and other mental problems
are likely to continue to be marginal parents even if they do successfully
complete a rehabilitation program, and living in a community where violence, despair, and substance abuse are pervasive greatly increases the
likelihood of relapse by the parent and of harm to the child.110
The decision context in which it would be most difficult to inject consideration of community fitness is parentage law, because individualized
best-interests decision making is virtually non-existent in this context currently. As explained in Part II, maternity and paternity laws now do not
call for a best-interests determination or for an assessment of birth parents’
capacity to parent. For the state to address the unfitness of the communities in which some birth parents live would therefore require a larger revision of these laws. I have argued elsewhere for substantial revision of parentage laws, on the grounds that they violate constitutional rights of some
newborn children, insofar as they force babies to be in legal relationships
with and the custody of unfit birth parents.111 I urge as a remedy for this
constitutional violation that states revise their parentage laws to withhold
legal parent status in the first instance from birth parents that are manifestly unfit, as evidenced by serious child maltreatment histories, substance
abuse, or incarceration. Those parents would be required to demonstrate
to a court that they have or soon could overcome the conditions that triggered state scrutiny. In deciding whether to confer legal parent status on
such birth parents, courts would take account of any parental characteristics that create a risk of harm to the child, just as courts today do in deciding whether to return to a parent a child whom CPS has previously taken
into custody. And in making such a decision, courts could also take into
account the neighborhood and social circle in which these presumptively
unfit parents live.
Thus, with respect to initial assignment of legal parenthood, the larger
step would be altering the rules to make anything other than biological
connection relevant to the state’s decision. Until that happens, there will
be no way for the state to address through parentage laws the concern that
some birth parents will take newborn babies home to live in terribly dysfunctional, dangerous communities. If a parental unfitness exception were
engrafted onto parentage laws, birth parents’ residential location could be

110.
111.

See Dwyer, supra note 43, at 424–27.
See generally Dwyer, supra note 43.
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a factor in assessing their fitness, along with their personal characteristics
and home environment. Community environment could count in favor of
conferring legal parent status, if the community is healthy and offers supportive services and connections for parents. Or it could count against
parentage, if the community is dysfunctional and poses dangers to children’s welfare.
As noted above, in addition to simply making neighborhood quality a
factor in decision making, the state might use categorical negative assessments about particular neighborhoods, short of declaring that they must
become and remain childless, in the various domestic relations and child
protection decision contexts. The state might shortcut decision making in
some contexts by establishing a presumption, perhaps an irrefutable one,
against granting legal parent status or custody of a child to persons who
live in certain communities. For example, in the parentage context, if any
individualized best-interest decision making were to be done, a prior public determination that a birth parent’s community is a “high risk” or “unsafe” area for children could constitute an “unfitness trigger” that forces
the birth parent to demonstrate in court that conferring legal parenthood on
him or her would, all things considered, be better for the child than the
available alternatives, such as adoption. Or it could constitute strong evidence against a birth parent brought into court by some other unfitness
trigger, such as a maltreatment history. In other words, state statutes could
say that a court must determine the parentage of every child born to an
adult who lives in residential area X, with a presumption against conferring legal parenthood on that adult. Or they could say that a court must
determine the parentage of every child born to an adult with a specified
maltreatment history, substance abuse problem, mental illness, or term of
incarceration and that, in doing so, it should also count heavily against
conferring legal parenthood on that adult that lives in a community declared to be unfit for children.
In the adoption context, state laws could impose a strong presumption
against, or an absolute bar to, adoption by persons who live in certain
neighborhoods, so that agencies need not even bother conducting a home
study for such applicants, as would occur today if an agency uncovered an
applicant’s prior conviction for a violent felony against a child. Similarly,
in choosing foster homes for children whom they remove from parental
custody, child protection agencies should exclude from eligibility homes in
horrible neighborhoods. In some cases, this will rule out kin placement, as
all or most of a parent’s extended family might live in the same or comparable neighborhoods. When two fit parents are competing for custody after
divorce or a paternity proceeding, the fact that one lives in an officially
“blighted” neighborhood could be fatal to their claim. Divorce law has
long been looking for presumptions that would allow courts to short cut
decision making and that would discourage some parents from litigating at
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all,112 and this is one presumption that might be unassailable and likely to
produce some efficiency gains (though, again, the poorest members of
society are not much represented in divorce cases). Even visitation with a
non-custodial parent could be affected; courts might justifiably condition
any visitation on its not taking place within particular neighborhoods.
In the child maltreatment context, legislatures might amend their statutory definitions of neglect to make a parent’s remaining in or moving into
a neighborhood after it has been declared unsuitable for children per se
neglect. This would be a form of “failure to protect,” a concept now applied to parental decisions to remain in or move into a household with
some person the parent knows to present a danger to the child, such as a
convicted child molester.113 Significantly, it is a concept applied ostensibly
without regard to the voluntariness of the parent’s choice to be in such a
household; it is no defense to a “failure to protect” charge to say that one
could not afford or was afraid to live elsewhere.114 In deciding whether to
return a child to parent custody or instead to terminate parental rights, the
law might contain a strong presumption that if a parent continues to reside
in an unfit community, return is inappropriate and the parent has not been
rehabilitated.
In any of these contexts, the adults involved could avoid unfavorable
treatment by moving. Agencies and courts could inform the individuals of
that, but at some point the individuals would simply become aware that
neighborhood quality matters and therefore realize that they could improve
their chances for a favorable outcome by relocating. Not all will choose to
do so, and for some that will be because of a perceived inability to relocate. In Part V below, I consider objections to the state’s imposing on
those who choose not to relocate the cost of being denied legal parenthood
or custody of a child. But probably many will choose to do so who would
not have done so otherwise, so the aggregate effect of both types of reforms should be an improvement in the average quality of neighborhood in
which children grow up. To the extent that relocations require higher expenditures on housing and transportation, this shift would necessitate a
reallocation of resources by parents and/or by public treasuries, but as
discussed further below, costs of living are not necessarily lower in
blighted inner-city neighborhoods than in some safer and healthier areas
outside of cities.
112.
See Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving Custody
Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1534–51 (1994) (discussing the use of
presumptions in custody disputes).
113.
See Kate Brittle, Child Abuse by Another Name: Why the Child Welfare System is the Best
Mechanism in Place to Address the Problem of Juvenile Prostitution, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1339, 1355
(2008).
114.
See Justine A. Dunlap, Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless Child: The Error of Pursuing
Battered Mothers for Failure to Protect, 50 LOY. L. REV. 565 (2004).
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IV. A CHILD’S RIGHT TO A SAFE NEIGHBORHOOD
Part III suggested several ways in which the state might improve child
welfare by endeavoring systematically to shift children from worse to better residential areas. This Part explains why doing so is not merely optional for the state, but in fact morally and legally obligatory. Children have a
right, against the state, that it make decisions about where and with whom
they live in a more careful way, one that is responsive to the seriously
adverse impact that poor neighborhood quality can have on children’s
well-being.
Begin with the premise, articulated in Part II above, that the state now
plays an essential role in the series of events by which children come to
live in particular places. It is not solely the result of private choices that
the world for some children is filled with danger, disease, and dysfunction. Rather, it is also a result of the state deciding, when a child is born,
who the child’s legal parents will be and what the scope of acceptable residential choices for parents is. We can imagine an advocate for a newborn
child objecting to application of a state’s maternity law, for example, on
the grounds that the birth mother lives in a hellish place and is unwilling to
relocate even if she receives state assistance in doing so. Imagine that the
advocate presents compelling evidence that the state’s making that woman
the baby’s legal mother would result in a much worse life for the child
than would making some other willing adult the child’s legal mother. Or
that it would be in the child’s best interest for the state to make the birth
mother the baby’s legal mother if and only if the state compels her to
move to a very different neighborhood. On the basis of that evidence, the
advocate would argue that the child has a moral and a Fourteenth Amendment due process right against the state’s forcing the child to be in a legal
family relationship with, and in the custody of, the birth mother. This
would not be a positive rights claim—that is, a plea for state assistance, or
for gratuitous state protection against private harm.115 It would be a negative rights claim—that is, a demand that the state not do something harmful to the child.116 This is a perfectly intelligible claim, one consistent with
prevailing constitutional doctrine.117 And it would be a claim with great
moral force, in essence objecting to abuse of state power: “How dare you,
the state legislature and courts, force this child to live with that woman in
that place, when you know that you are consigning the child to a life lived
in a hell on earth?”
115.
See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195–96 (1989) (discussing the constitutional distinction between a limitation on interference with rights and an obligation
to provide assistance).
116.
See id.
117.
See generally Dwyer, supra note 41.
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It is easier to recognize the state’s active role in creating a child’s living situation if one first considers certain analogous cases where the state
action is well recognized. One such case is appointment of guardians for
incompetent adults.118 Imagine an adult becoming mentally incompetent
suddenly, perhaps as a result of an illness, while remaining physically fit,
and the state’s needing to make a decision about the person’s care, including who will serve as guardian. Suppose two persons, both blood relatives, wish to assume control of the person’s life and that both petition to
become the guardian. Suppose further that one of them lives in a safe and
well-functioning suburban community whereas the other lives in a crimeand drug-infested inner-city housing project where residents are afraid to
leave their homes and stray bullets come through apartment windows. The
state can easily elicit information about where the petitioners live and
where they intend for the incompetent adult to live.
If the state chose to place the ward in the care and custody of the petitioner who lives in a horrible environment and who intends to stay there,
we would readily recognize that state action is involved in creating the
ward’s overall living situation, including his or her location in a dangerous
and dysfunctional community, and we would expect the state to justify its
seemingly inappropriate decision—for example, by explaining that the
other petitioner was wholly unsuited to the guardian role, that there was
no reasonable alternative placement, and that it has strongly encouraged
this petitioner to move to another location. Absent adequate justification,
we would think the state has abused its power to appoint a caregiver for an
incompetent person and has violated a moral and constitutional right of the
incompetent adult. And it would not be sufficient justification if the state
explained that it simply chooses not to inquire about the residential circumstances of any petitioners for guardianship. We would say that if the
state is going to involve itself in the incompetent person’s life to the extent
of conferring on some other person legal power over the incompetent person’s life, it must do so with care and in a manner designed, at a minimum, to avoid putting the incompetent person in danger.
There have not been constitutional challenges to state appointment of
guardians for incompetent adults, because state statutes require that this be
done in accordance with the ward’s best interests anyway, 119 in stark contrast to parentage laws, which generally make no reference to the child’s
welfare. However, there have been judicial findings of constitutional violations in the somewhat similar context of the state’s committing incompetent adults to the custody of psychiatric or intensive care facilities where

118.
See Dwyer, supra note 43, at 785–86.
119.
Because of the best interests standard, any objection to appointment of a particular guardian
could rely simply on such a statute. See Dwyer, supra note 42, at 785–86.
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internal conditions are unhealthy or unsafe.120 Even convicted criminals
have recognized constitutional rights against the state’s consigning them to
terrible living conditions.121 Those cases involve commitment to a residential facility operated by state actors, which might appear to make them
distinguishable; but a constitutional claim should lie as well if the state
consigned adults to private long-term care facilities that the state knew to
be unsafe and unhealthy, or if the state placed convicted criminals in privately run prisons it knew to have terrible conditions.122
Also analogous are selections of foster parents and adoptive parents;
sometimes the state must choose such caretakers for a child, and when it
does so, there clearly is state action and we expect the state to do so with
some care.123 If, for example, the state gave preference in adoption or selection of foster parents to convicted sex offenders, to compensate them
for the fact that they might have difficulty finding a partner with whom to
procreate, we would clearly see state action and believe that it violates a
constitutional right of children. Even if the state chose such persons accidentally, because it simply did not do any sort of background check on the
applicants it had for adoption or foster care, we would fault the state for
acting irresponsibly and want to hold it accountable for any abuse children
incur as a result. Likewise if the state approved “new family” adoptions
(i.e., adoptions of children with whom the adopters have no connection by
biology or marriage) by people living in horrible inner-city neighborhoods, as a matter of sympathy-induced preferences or because the state
simply chose not to care anymore what sort of life adopters could give
children, we would perceive state action that should be subject to constitutional challenges.
Similarly, there is state action, requiring justification, whenever the
legislature or a court makes a decision about whom a child’s legal parents
and custodians will be. That includes a decision at the legislative level to
make biological parents the legal parents of a child without regard to the
parents’ residence (or personal fitness or home environment). As in the
case of guardianship for adults and adoption of parentless children, it is no
justification for the state to explain that it simply chooses not to inquire
about such information. The state should not assume control over the lives
120.
See id. at 785.
121.
See id. at 784.
122.
See Rosborough v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 350 F.3d 459, 461 (5th Cir. 2003) (agreeing
with the Sixth Circuit and with district courts “that have found that private prison-management corporations and their employees may be sued under § 1983 by a prisoner who has suffered a constitutional
injury”).
123.
See Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 809–12 (3d Cir. 2000) (adopting a “deliberate indifference” standard to selection of foster parents and citing decisions of other courts applying similar
standard); Kenny A. v. Perdue, No. 1:02-CV-1686-MHS, 2004 WL 5503780, at *3–4 (N.D. Ga.
Dec. 13, 2004) (holding that children have a substantive due process right to the state’s selecting foster
parents on the basis of a “professional judgment”).
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of children in this way unless it does so with care; otherwise, some children might be better off if no legal relationships with adults are established,
and they simply remain in a birthing facility or if a nurse or doctor who is
present at the birth takes them home and assumes de facto custody. And in
fact, the state typically does have information about birth parent’s residential location, just as they have information about birth parents who have
abused other children, have committed serious felonies, or have used illegal drugs during pregnancy.124 Birthing facilities must report all births to
a state department of health or vital records, and in their reports they
would typically include home addresses for the persons expected to be the
legal parents.125 A simple computer program at the receiving state agency
could flag births to biological parents who live in unfit communities.
There is also clearly state action when the state designates particular
spaces as appropriate for residence by all persons, knowing that some
adults who are parents will choose to live there with children, and legally
empowers parents to choose to live there, even though it is aware that
some such spaces are truly unfit for residence by children. Because parents have that legal authority over children’s residence, they can call upon
the state to enforce their choices as to where children live, as against other
private parties (e.g., an extended family member, a teacher) or government actors who might wish to cause particular children to live in different
places. It is because the state has made the adults with whom children in
horrible inner-city neighborhoods live the legal parents of those children
and has reposed in them the legal authority to choose where the children
will live that a person concerned about the children’s welfare cannot drive
through the neighborhood with a bus, collecting the children and bringing
them to live in a safe and attractive group home in the suburbs or out in
the country. If someone did that, the parents could call the police, and the
police would track down and return the children and would throw the dogooder in jail.
Thus, the state’s position with respect to children living in hellish
neighborhoods is not one of a passive, inactive onlooker; rather, it is one
of an active participant, consigning children to the custody of adults who
live in such neighborhoods, empowering the persons it selects as legal
parents to decide where children will live, and designating places as suitable for residence.126 Even if one is inclined to defend this entrenched state
124.
See Dwyer, supra note 43, at 441–45. States have this information because they maintain child
abuse registries and records of criminal convictions, and because birthing facilities that discover illegal
drugs present in a newborn’s bloodstream must report this to the local child protection agency. Id.
125.
See id. at 408.
126.
The Supreme Court was simply oblivious to the state’s role in family formation when it rendered its decision in Deshaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services. 489 U.S. 189
(1989) (holding that mother of abused child could not maintain constitutional tort action against child
protection agency that repeatedly returned the child to the custody of his abusive father).
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practice, on grounds such as those I consider in Part V below, one should
acknowledge that state actions and state decisions are playing a crucial role
in where children live and that the state should be prepared to defend its
actions and decisions. Viewing the state as an active participant makes it
easier to see the plausibility of a claim that any child residing in a very
dangerous neighborhood reflects a violation of the child’s moral and constitutional rights by the state. The suggested moral claim against the state
on behalf of a newborn child whose birth parents live in a horrible neighborhood is not “please save me from private dangers you played no part in
creating,” but rather “you must not put me into a legal relationship with or
in the custody of people living in that place and you should not be telling
the citizenry that that place is suitable for children to live.”
Even more clearly, a constitutional claim against the state in the United States must allege affirmative conduct on the part of the state,127 and
this can quite plausibly be done. The state infringes the substantive due
process rights of children under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States when it chooses for them legal parents who live
in unfit communities, empowers legal parents to choose where children
will live from among all areas zoned residential, and encourages parents to
live in unfit communities by designating them as suitable for residence by
all private individuals, including children, despite their unfitness. A representative for a newborn child should be permitted to assert such a claim
and to seek injunctive relief against the state, requiring the state, if it is
going to continue to take control of children’s lives in this fundamental
way, either to assign the child to legal parents who would not choose to
live in an unfit community or to prohibit parents from locating children in
an unfit community. A guardian for a newborn whose parents live in such
a place could seek a negative injunction against the state’s applying its
parentage laws to that child, against the state’s issuing a birth certificate
with the birth parents’ name on it, and against any state effort to force
nurses and doctors in the birthing facility to relinquish possession of the
child in favor of the birth parents.
Thus, in this context, as in selection of guardians or private care facilities for incompetent adults, selection of private prisons for convicted criminals, and selection of foster and adoptive parents for children, we should
view the state as constrained by the Fourteenth Amendment to operate in a
certain fashion in making momentous decisions about private individual’s
lives—at a minimum, not acting with deliberate indifference to the fate
likely to result for those individuals from the state’s decisions. Decisions
about whom a person’s family members will be are decisions the state in a

127.
See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Ripple Effects of Slaughter-house: A Critique of a Negative Rights
View of the Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REV. 409 (1990).
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modern liberal society presumptively should not be making for anyone,
and when the state must do so, its authority to do so should extend no further than the justification for its doing so. If children require the state to
choose a legal family for them, solely because of their incompetence, the
state should aim solely to provide competent decision making that substitutes for the children’s own decision making—that is, that chooses on behalf of the child the alternative, among all those available, that we might
expect the child to do if able, which presumably means the alternative
most likely to serve the child’s best interests, all things considered. As
argued further in Part V, there is no justification for the state’s doing otherwise.
In other words, state decision making about children’s lives is best
conceptualized as proxy decision making on their behalf, pursuant to the
state’s traditional parens patriae role as ultimate protector of nonautonomous persons, just as is state decision making about the lives of
incompetent adults.128 As such, it should aim solely to achieve what is best
for the children, and it should do so as competently and thoroughly as is
reasonably possible, which would entail taking into account all factors
relevant to their welfare.129 Such factors clearly include the suitability of
particular communities for child rearing, as measured by the sorts of circumstances that governments and private organizations consider in identifying “blighted” neighborhoods or in ranking communities based on
“quality of life”—namely, poverty rate, crime rate, prevalence of substance abuse, and availability and quality of public and private services
such as schools and medical care. For the state to make decisions as to
who will be a child’s legal parent and custodian, as to what power legal
parents will have over children’s residential locations, and as to what areas
it will designate as suitable for children to live, without regard for the
harm these decisions are likely to cause the child, is to abuse its power and
violate the constitutional rights of the child. Thus, children arguably have
a substantive due process right that the state at least make reasonable efforts to ensure that they do not, as a result of these state decisions and
actions, end up living in horribly unhealthy and unsafe neighborhoods.
V. OBJECTIONS
As explained in Part III, my proposals resemble many other common
and widely accepted government practices. This might provide some reason to think that they are permissible, feasible, and not unjust. Governments routinely declare neighborhoods “blighted” for certain purposes,
including the purpose of forcing people to move out, through a condemna128.
129.

See Dwyer, supra note 42, at 766.
For an extended philosophical account of why this is the case, see DWYER, supra note 53.
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tion or abatement proceeding. They condemn buildings or blocks of buildings, declaring them unfit for human habitation, which results in forced
relocation of many residents. Zoning laws identify areas of a community
as unfit for residential purposes, because of proximity to unsafe conditions
or to other incompatible uses, and initial creation of such a law could result in residential displacement. Thus, governments are fairly comfortable
with the concept and practice of categorically assessing physical spaces in
relation to habitation and of coercing people’s residential choices, sometimes even baldly ordering them to relocate without offering them any
assistance to do so. My zoning proposal is unusual simply because it targets the residential circumstances of large groups of children and coerces
large groups of adults as to their choices of residence just for the sake of
children. The proposal to consider community quality in all decision making about parentage and child custody is also novel, but Part II showed
that it is not unprecedented for the state to consider it in some decisions.
Despite the resemblance of my proposals to some existing government
practices, they are likely to be jarring to many people. The idea of a territory in which children may not live or even visit could be the premise of a
science fiction movie. To recommend denying or diminishing a parentchild relationship because of the neighborhood in which an adult lives
might sound like urging that parents be punished for being poor. Because
these specific ideas are novel, there have not been published judicial or
scholarly objections to them, but one might anticipate a number of objections. In particular, from an assumption that no individual can be held
responsible for the quality of life in any given neighborhood, various unfairness objections might seem to follow. In addition, coercing people to
move, although governments do it fairly routinely, does implicate constitutional rights, and threatening to deny or terminate parental status to people
because of where they choose to live implicates constitutional rights under
current doctrine—that of parents to raise their offspring—that generally
does not come up in other land use situations and that might be stronger
than property rights or the right to choose where to live.130 There are also
humanitarian and pragmatic concerns that arise from disrupting people’s
ties to a community and their daily interactions with extended family,
some of which entail provision of needed care to family members, such as
elderly parents.
It is worth noting at the outset, though, that my proposals do not entail
certain adverse consequences for affected individuals that some other restrictions on residence and mobility do. My proposals should not trigger
130.
See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(recognizing right of parents to choose child’s education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923) (vacating a law that forbade the teaching of a foreign language prior to the eighth grade based on
a parent’s right to instruct children).
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feelings in residents that the government is messing with their lives out of
self-interest because private developers are lining politicians’ pockets, the
way they do with many eminent domain and condemnation actions.131 In
addition, most types of exclusionary zoning practices with which we have
experience involve trying to keep people out of objectively desirable places, and those often have stigmatizing effects, generating feelings in the
excluded of unworthiness and of being disdained, especially if they are
motivated by immoral and irrational prejudices, such as racism.132 My
proposals, in contrast, entail requiring or encouraging people to move out
of undesirable places and to relocate to better residential areas, and the
reason for doing so is not based on an assumption that they occupy an
inferior social status relative to those who are permitted to remain, but
rather an assumption that the persons targeted occupy an important social
role that cannot properly be carried out in the undesirable places. Even
denying some persons child custody on the basis of neighborhood quality
does not in and of itself amount to a judgment about their inherent qualities as parents, except perhaps sending signals that they have made poor
decisions relating to child rearing—namely, where their children live.
Nevertheless, there is likely to be a perception that the state is judging
parents and communities negatively, for creating a bad environment for
children and perhaps indirectly for being poor. There might also be a perception that the government is being callous in breaking up communities,
social networks, and families. This final Part addresses numerous potential
objections to the idea of making some residential areas “no-child zones”
for child protection purposes and to the idea of disfavoring parents and
potential parents in individualized judicial and agency decisions on the
basis of their residential locations.
A. Punishing Parents for Things Other Than Their Own Conduct
Some might object that state action imposing costs on people because
of the poor quality of their neighborhoods amounts to unfair punishment.
Denying people legal parent status or custody of a child is a quite substantial cost to impose on them, and effectively forcing them to relocate also
imposes a large cost.133 The state would appear to be imposing one cost or
the other because of conduct by people other than those who are incurring
the cost—that is, because other people commit crimes, sell drugs, fail to
care for their property, do not supervise their children, and so forth. It is a
131.
See generally Steve Chambers, Angry Citizens Get Their Say on Eminent Domain, STARLEDGER, Mar. 14, 2006, at 13 (noting the perception of impropriety by some critics of eminent domain
actions).
132.
See Zick, supra note 102, at 591–92, 604, 606.
133.
John A. Powell, Opportunity-Based Housing, 12 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & CMTY. DEV. L.
188, 189 (2003).
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basic moral principle that people should not suffer for the wrongs of others.134 In contrast, a parent’s or potential parent’s home environment is
typically something over which he or she does have control, and so we
feel more comfortable holding that individual responsible for problems in
the home environment.
This objection is unpersuasive for many reasons. First, the assumption
that the cost would be imposed solely because of other people’s conduct is
likely false in many cases, perhaps most. The adults on whom the cost
would be imposed presumptively have chosen to live in the community
and/or to have a child, and they can be held responsible for that choice.
Underlying the objection, though, might be an additional assumption that
many people who live in communities unsuitable for children are incapable
of living elsewhere, because they cannot afford to live elsewhere or because they need the support of others in those communities. That assumption has some plausibility, because there is a shortage of low-income housing nationwide, finding employment in new locations can be difficult, and
many people do rely on neighbors and family members for child care,
elder care, and other needs.135 Moreover, some parents might feel forced
to move into bad neighborhoods after they already have children.
But surely it is not true of every parent living in an unfit community
that they cannot move to better neighborhoods; many might have the
means, but choose to remain in familiar surroundings and near family and
friends because they get some gratification from living there. Many of
those who can move might be faulted for not putting their child’s welfare
first.
In fact, there are many places in the United States that are not crimeand drug-ridden and where people live with very little income, even just
welfare benefits.136 It might not be especially difficult financially for parents to move themselves and their children to a small town or rural area;
most likely, many inner-city residents simply do not consider moving to
such a place, and those who do might reject the idea for non-financial reasons, such as wanting to stay near family or anticipating boredom and
loneliness. Further, there are public and private employment agencies in
many communities to help people find employment.137 And there is federal
134.
See generally Max Stier, Note, Corruption of Blood and Equal Protection: Why the Sins of
Parents Should Not Matter, 44 STAN. L. REV. 727, 731 (1992).
135.
See Deborah J. Jones et al., Mothers’ Perceptions of Neighborhood Violence and MotherReported Monitoring of African American Children: An Examination of the Moderating Role of Perceived Support, 36 BEHAV. THERAPY 25, 27 (2005); Powell, supra note 133, at 192, 195–97.
136.
See generally James A. Kurre, Is the Cost of Living Less in Rural Areas?, 26 INT’L REGIONAL
SCI. REV. 86, 109 (2003); Jennifer Sherman, Coping with Rural Poverty: Economic Survival and
Moral Capital in Rural America, 85 SOC. FORCES 891 (2006).
137.
Tian Luo et al., The Expanding Role of Temporary Help Services from 1990 to 2008, 133
MONTHLY LAB. REV. Aug. 2010 at 3, 10 (explaining the enormous growth of temporary employment
in counties which were at the lowest levels of temporary employment).
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funding to subsidize housing for some low-income individuals through
programs in which parents currently in unfit communities could be given
priority.138 Local governments, if acting rationally, should be willing to
contribute relocation assistance, as well, to poor people wishing to move
out of certain jurisdictions with their children, in light of the substantial
costs those people are likely to impose on governments if they stay, by
needing various social services.139 So the state could obviate concerns
about moving costs by offering relocation vouchers to all parents, to
finance the cost of moving, and by expanding low-cost housing subsidy
programs. This would expand the range of options for the many people
who want to move to better places.140 In addition, currently people living
in poverty are forced to move often anyway, as rents change and buildings
are condemned or renovated, so they do not have much stability in their
lives as it is.141 Relocation to entirely different environments, to better
functioning communities, might allow them greater stability.
In short, a blanket assumption that every parent living in a horrible
neighborhood is incapable of moving elsewhere is unwarranted; probably
most who would be affected by the reforms I propose are living in unfit
communities by choice. Their choices might be understandable, insofar as
they are motivated by desires to remain near family, friends, and familiar
places, but they are nonetheless choices. And those who are not living in
such places by choice might welcome relocation assistance, even if they
are told they must accept it or risk denial or removal of child custody.
Moreover, probably most children who live in terrible neighborhoods
were conceived and born when their parents already lived in those neighborhoods, so the parents presumptively have made at least that voluntary
decision—that is to have a child, or to risk creating a child by having sex,
despite knowing the child would live in the terrible place—that can be a
basis for justifying imposing costs on them, just as such a decision is a
basis for imposing the costs of a child support obligation.
Second, even if we assume that some people cannot afford to relocate,
at least not without substantial government assistance that is not presently
available, and therefore that some people are not responsible for the fact
that they live in one community rather than another, it does not follow that
imposing costs on them, in terms of their parental interests, is unfair pu138.
See Powell, supra note 133, at 205 (urging expansion of low-cost housing in suburban areas);
see also id. at 192–93 (critiquing the Section 8 program).
139.
Chicago instituted a relocation program in the early 1990s, with apparent success. Id. at 197.
On the other hand, some cities have at times relocated people to even worse places. See, e.g., JONNES,
supra note 2, at 14–18 (discussing relocation of people from shelters in Manhattan to tenements in the
South Bronx).
140.
See Powell, supra note 133, at 189–90; Tegeler, supra note 98, at 211 (noting that demand for
relocation assistance currently “far exceeds . . . supply”).
141.
Powell, supra note 133, at 198.
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nishment. Not every cost people incur at the hands of the state or private
parties is a punishment. Typically, we are more likely to view as punishment taking away from someone a good that they currently possess, as
opposed to declining to give someone a good that he does not possess but
wants to have.142 Some of the state decisions discussed above are of the
latter sort. Birth parents who fill out an application for a birth certificate
and adults who apply for adoption are asking the state to give them something they do not yet have—namely, legal parent status as to a new entrant
to the human community and all the legal rights that go with it.143 Parents
who seek a transfer of custody to them from another parent or from the
state (i.e., when a child is in foster care) are also asking for something
they do not currently have. Refusing these requests looks less like the state
imposing a cost on people than does taking away legal parent status in a
termination of parental rights proceeding or taking custody away from a
parent in a domestic relations or child protection proceeding.
Even with respect to state decisions taking away an existing legal status or disrupting a parent’s relationship with a child, however, it is inconsistent with our views of analogous decisions in other contexts to characterize the decisions as punishment. For instance, in adults’ decisions about
the relationships they will form or dissolve with other adults, we generally
do not characterize as punishment one person’s deciding that he does not
want the relationship. If one adult declined an invitation by another adult
to marry, in part because the other adult lived in a neighborhood with a
very low quality of life and was unwilling to move, we would not ordinarily characterize that decision as a punishment. This is because the notion
of punishment entails an intention to cause suffering,144 and in such a case
any suffering is incidental and unintended. The same would be true if two
individuals were already in a relationship such as an intimate partnership
and at some point a disagreement about where they should live became
severe enough that one chose to exit the relationship. We would not say
the one who chose to exit was punishing the other, unless her intent was
just to inflict pain on the other as a consequence for his insistence on living in a bad place; we would instead say that she is simply doing what she
thinks is best for herself. The state, in deciding parentage and custody, is
142.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1353 (9th ed. 2009) (stating that punishment is a “sanction—such
as a fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of property, right, or privilege—assessed against a person who
has violated the law”).
143.
Some might respond to this point by asserting that biological parents have a moral right to
raise their children and that the state would be violating or taking away that right by denying them
legal parent status. I have explained at length elsewhere why no adults have a moral entitlement to
raise their biological offspring. See DWYER, supra note 53, at 170–204.
144.
See Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The infliction of punishment
is a deliberate act intended to chastise or deter.”); MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, available at
http:// www. merriam-webster. com/ dictionary/ punishment (last visited Aug. 23, 2011) (defining
punishment as “suffering, pain, or loss that serves as retribution”).
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effectively acting as an agent for the child, pursuant to its parens patriae
responsibility, making the same sort of decision about relationship formation on behalf of an individual child. The state, in terminating parental
rights or taking custody away from a parent, is not aiming to inflict suffering on the parent; it is aiming, rather, just to do what is best for the child.
Other analogies can be drawn to adverse actions the state takes toward
persons that are not punishment—for example, quarantining those who
carry contagious diseases.145 And the law requires persons to do many
other things as conditions for becoming or remaining parents and custodians, such as having a home somewhere, securing medical care, getting a
child to school, and providing clothing and food to children, and those
conditions are not deemed punitive.146
Third, though action need not be a punishment to be unfair, the analogy to adult decision making about relationships with other adults suggests
that state decisions to deprive adults of parentage or custody based in part
on the neighborhoods they inhabit are not unfair regardless of whether
they can be characterized as punishment. Indeed, there are other things
outside the control of parents and would-be parents on the basis of which
the state denies them custody or parental status. Mental illness and mental
or physical disability are clear examples. People who suffer from such
unchosen conditions will have that counted against them in applications for
adoption, in a post-divorce custody disputes, in decisions whether to remove abused or neglected children from their custody or to return them to
parental custody after removal, and in termination of parental rights proceedings.147 In addition, people routinely have counted against them in
such contexts their associations with other people whose behaviors could
be harmful to children, even when it might be quite difficult for them to
avoid associations with such persons. For example, if a divorced mother
remarries to a man with a history of criminal sexual abuse of children, or
if she has a father with a history of child sexual abuse, a court could certainly count against her in a custody dispute her continued association with
such a person if the children would be involved in that association.148 A

145.
See, e.g., THE CNTR. FOR L. & THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, The Turning Point Model State Public Health Act: State Legislative Update Table (2007), http:// www. publichealthlaw. net/Resources/
ResourcesPDFs /MSPHA% 20LegisTrack .pdf.
146.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-28-12(a) (1975); ALA. CODE § 26-16-2(6) (1975).
147.
See, e.g., GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 290-9-2.06(3)(d)(6) (2007) (consideration of mental and
physical health in home study of adoption applicants); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (2008) (“In determining best interests of a child for purposes of determining custody or visitation . . . the court shall
consider . . . [t]he age and physical and mental condition of each parent”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 210, § 3(c)(xii) (West 2010) (listing “mental deficiency” and mental illness among the bases for
finding a parent unfit in termination of parental rights proceedings).
148.
See, e.g., In re Tidwell, 35 S.W.3d 115 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (accepting termination of
mother’s parental rights where evidence revealed that mother allowed her children to live with and
near several sexually abusive relatives).
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more controversial example is the practice of removing children from the
custody of parents who are chronic victims of partner abuse.149 Adults who
live in horrible neighborhoods are associating with a larger group of coresidents in a setting (a neighborhood) that is less intimate and intense than
a home, but who nevertheless pose a very real threat to children’s well
being on a daily basis.
Of course, there are objections to the state counting some of these other things against parents or potential parents as well. In particular, advocates for parents with disabilities have objected to some state decisions
denying custody based on the disability,150 and there is a large amount of
scholarly literature opposing the practice of removing children from the
custody of domestic violence victims.151 Advocates for persons with disabilities, though, have generally not argued that the state must ignore any
disabilities. Rather, they have argued that the state has a moral and constitutional responsibility first to provide assistance that would compensate for
the disability—for example, by providing intensive parenting training to a
person with a mental disability.152 Likewise, scholars who object to removal of children from domestic violence victims do not argue that witnessing domestic violence against a parent is not bad for children, nor that
the state should be oblivious to it. Rather, they argue, like those advocating for disabled persons, that the state should do more to assist the unfortunate parent, which in the case of domestic violence victims would mean
helping them avoid being abused.153 Some do maintain that it is always
wrong to impose the cost of separation from children on women just because of conduct by someone else,154 but they provide no response to the
reasoning above—in particular, the point that state decisions about child
custody cannot permissibly be based on anything other than the child’s
best interests, and the point that the state routinely and without objection
imposes costs on parents for several others things beyond parents’ control.
Consistent with the arguments of advocates for persons who are disabled and for domestic violence victims, one might maintain that my pro149.
See, e.g., Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 2004) (addressing constitutional
challenge to policy of removing children from custodial parents solely on the basis of the parents’
failure to protect children from witnessing domestic violence against the parents).
150.
See, e.g., Susan Kerr, The Application of the Americans with Disabilities Act to the Termination of the Parental Rights of Individuals with Mental Disabilities, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 387 (2000); Dave Shade, Empowerment for the Pursuit of Happiness: Parents with Disabilities
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 16 LAW & INEQ. 153 (1998).
151.
See Zandra D’Ambrosio, Advocating for Comprehensive Assessments in Domestic Violence
Cases, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 654, 655 (2008) (citing PETER G. JAFFE ET AL., MAKING APPROPRIATE
PARENTING ARRANGEMENTS IN FAMILY VIOLENCE CASES: APPLYING THE LITERATURE TO IDENTIFY
PROMISING PRACTICES 56 (2005); Nany Ver Steegh & Clare Dalton, Report from the Wingspread
Conference on Domestic Violence and Family Courts, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 454, 456 (2008)).
152.
See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 150, at 413–25.
153.
See, e.g., D’Ambrosio, supra note 151, at 659–63 (and other sources cited therein).
154.
See, e.g., Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 252 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
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posals are fair to parents only if coupled with substantial programs of relocation assistance, more substantial than those that currently exist. I have
suggested that it would be rational of local governments to devote resources to evacuating children and parents from inner-city neighborhoods,
and I believe a strong argument could be made for the state having a moral
duty to children to assist parents financially in moving, an argument that
rests on an assumption of the state’s partial responsibility for the children’s predicaments. But the fact that governments generally do not provide
relocation assistance following eminent domain or condemnation actions
suggests that popular morality does not ascribe a right to people to government relocation assistance whenever the government requires them to
move.
Finally, it bears mention that the major normative premise of the unfairness objection, that people should not suffer because of the choices of
others, applies even more clearly to the current plight of children in unfit
communities and so bolsters the argument that children have a right not to
live in such places. Children should not have to bear the enormous cost of
growing up in conditions akin to a war zone that arises from choices parents make using their state-conferred power over children’s lives. Forcing
children to live in hellish places would seem more clearly unfair than forcing parents to move out of hellish places, with or without state assistance.
B. Disparate Impact on Persons Who Are Poor or of Minority Race
Related to the first objection is a group-focused unfairness complaint—
namely, that the reforms I propose would fall most heavily on poor and
minority race people.155 As explained in Part I, chronic poverty is an indicator of community unfitness, because of the dysfunctions correlated to it,
so the reforms would obviously fall most heavily on the poor. Those living
in the most impoverished neighborhoods are disproportionately of minority
race.156 Indeed, the concentration of racial minorities in blighted areas is in
significant part a result of racist government policies and racist practices
of private businesses and individuals.157 Thus, although my proposals target dysfunctions rather than poverty or race per se, there would be a disparate impact on historically subordinated groups. A similar argument is
often made against state child protection interventions more generally.158

155.
Cf. Sheila Crowley, HOPE VI: What Went Wrong?, in FROM DESPAIR TO HOPE, supra note 2,
at 229 (complaining that demolition of public housing projects and the forced relocation that is involved has been traumatic for poor families).
156.
See NEIGHBORHOOD POVERTY: POLICY IMPLICATIONS IN STUDYING NEIGHBORHOODS, supra
note 2, at 1–3; WAGMILLER, supra note 28, at 165, 175.
157.
See GORDON, supra note 2, at 69–111; TURNER, POPKIN & RAWLINGS, supra note 2, at 3–5.
158.
See Dwyer, supra note 43, at 470–72.
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Such a disparate impact no longer supports a constitutional challenge
to state action,159 but it might nevertheless support a moral challenge. The
challenge would fail, however. It would fail, first of all, because it ignores
the fact that the reforms are aimed at helping children who are living or
would begin living in poverty absent the reforms, and these children are
disproportionately of minority race. Thus, while one might perceive an
adverse disparate impact on certain groups of adults, to the extent that the
reforms do result in coercing some people to disrupt their lives or denying
some people parent status or custody,160 there would be a positive disparate impact on similar groups of children, assuming that the reforms advance their welfare.
The challenge would fail also because there is little to commend a
moral premise that people are entitled not to have the state impose policies
whose cost falls most heavily on a group to which they belong, when the
policies do not reflect an aim of causing that group suffering and instead
reflect entirely legitimate government aims. There are innumerable examples of other government policies that have a disparate impact and that do
not lead to this sort of group-based unfairness complaint. Tax laws aim to
encourage activities the government values and to discourage activities the
government disvalues,161 and as such they have a negative disparate impact
on groups engaged in activities the government does not value. Even when
similar disparate impact complaints do arise in other contexts—for example, in connection with bans on activities most likely to be engaged in by
persons who are poor, such as prostitution162 and shoplifting,163—they do
not carry the day.
Further, we generally accept that private individuals’ choices in the
aggregate can have a disparate impact on historically subordinated groups,
but that those choices must nevertheless be accepted. As argued above,
state best-interests decision making about children’s relationships should
be viewed as substituting for the self-determining relationship choices private individuals ordinarily make for themselves, warranted only by children’s need for a surrogate decision maker. Adults’ relationship choices
provide an apt analogy. In the aggregate, these choices have a disparate
impact on the poor, because all else being equal, adults generally prefer to
form intimate partnerships with people who are not poor. No one would
159.
See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977).
160.
I say one might perceive a disparate impact, rather than there will be a disparate impact,
because one might believe parents are benefited when their children’s welfare is advanced, even if the
parents do not see the benefit and even if the parents suffer in the process.
161.
JOSEPH M. BESSETTE & JOHN J. PITNEY JR., AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS:
DELIBERATION, DEMOCRACY, AND CITIZENSHIP 571 (2011).
162.
See generally TEELA SANDERS, MAGGIE O’NEIL, & JANE PITCHER, PROSTITUTION: SEX
WORK, POLICY AND POLITICS 33 (2009).
163.
See generally KERRY SEGRAVE, SHOPLIFTING: A SOCIAL HISTORY 36 (2001).
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suggest that the state should take steps to ameliorate this impact by forcing
some adults to be in relationships with or to live with poor people. The
alternative in the present context would be to treat children instrumentally
by allowing sympathy for unfortunate adults to justify sacrificing the
children’s welfare, or in other words to give the unfortunate adults parental status or custody as a kind of compensation for their misfortunes, ignoring the welfare costs for the children. It is a basic premise of our
shared morality that persons should not be treated as instruments to gratify
others.
C. The Reforms Would Harm the Very Persons They Aim To Benefit
Both advocates for persons with disabilities and scholars opposed to
removals of children from domestic violence victims also argue that removal from parental custody does more harm to children than good, even
if there are problems with parental custody.164 At least in most cases, they
argue, the best outcome for the child will be to maintain parental custody
despite the costs for a child that a disability or witnessing abuse of their
parent might have on the child. One might argue, similarly, that even if
state decision making about children’s legal relationships and residences is
a proxy decision for the children in which nothing matters except what is
best for the children, that assessment must be a comprehensive one,
weighing the costs and benefits as to each of several imperfect alternatives. One might argue further that although bad neighborhoods are a
problem for children, separating children from parents just for that reason
will typically not serve children’s overall well being. Encouraging parents
to move out and offering them assistance to do so is one thing, but removing children from their custody if they decline is quite another, and could
be, on the whole, bad for the children.
The major premise of this line of reasoning—namely, that state decisions about children’s relational lives should be based on comprehensive
assessments of children’s best interests, rather than focused on just one
aspect of life—is unassailable. However, it does not support an indictment
of my proposals, for several reasons.
First, it is inapposite to my proposal for revising domestic relations
and child protection laws. That proposal does not entail state decision
making about the relational lives of individual children based solely on
neighborhood quality. Rather, it would simply make neighborhood quality
one of many factors in an overall best-interests assessment, to be balanced
against other child welfare considerations. As such, it should never result
in decisions that are, on the whole, bad for children. Moreover, assess164.

See, e.g., D’Ambrosio, supra note 151, at 659–60.
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ment of a neighborhood would take into account existing positive aspects,
such as the existence of a supportive social network, as well as negative
aspects.
The zoning proposal, on the other hand, could entail denial or disruption of parent-child relationships, when adults refuse to move out of unfit
communities. However, an objection to the zoning proposal based on the
costs of separating children from parents has substantial purchase only in
contexts where certain adults have an established and healthy social parent-child relationships with their children. It has very little purchase in the
context of state decision making as to who will be a newborn baby’s legal
parents, because then there is not the concern about severing an existing
attachment, and there is ample supply of adoptive parents for newborns.165
To be sure, the biological connection is a relevant consideration in assessing the overall welfare of a child in connection with parentage decision
making, but it is only one consideration among many and is less significant than a child’s interests in basic health and safety. An argument based
on costs of separating children from parents also has little purchase in situations where custodial parents’ relationship with a child is attenuated for
other reasons, and parental refusal to move with the child might evidence
such attenuation, as might also parental maltreatment of a child, which
occurs at a very high rate in unfit communities.166
The greatest concern would relate to removal of older children from
parents to whom they are attached and who have not maltreated them, yet
who refuse to move out of a neighborhood deemed unfit for children. One
way to address this concern might be to take the stronger step of simply
ordering the parents to move by issuing an order to vacate. Many local
governments have substantial experience with such orders addressed to
entire households.167 Alternatively, the state might infer that parents who
place more importance on staying in a current home and maintaining connections to local residents than on maintaining custody of their children
are indifferent or marginal parents, even though they would not otherwise
be deemed to have maltreated the children. It might treat the decision to
stay behind as itself a form of neglect, just as child protection agencies do
when parents choose to continue living with another adult who has abused
their child. In “failure to protect” cases, a refusal to change one’s living
situation for the sake of the child signals an unwillingness to provide ade165.
See NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
ADOPTION EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN AND MEN AND DEMAND FOR CHILDREN TO ADOPT BY WOMEN
18–44 YEARS OF AGE IN THE UNITED STATES (2002), available at http:// www. cdc. gov/ nchs/ data/
series/ sr_23/ sr23_ 027.pdf.
166.
See CHRISTOPHER JAMES HOBBS, HELGA G.I. HANKS, & JANE M. WYNNE, CHILD ABUSE
AND NEGLECT: A CLINICIAN’S HANDBOOK 5 (2d ed. 1999).
167.
See David Schultz, What’s Yours Can Be Mine: Are There Any Private Takings After Kelo v.
City of New London, 24 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 195, 212 (2005).
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quately for the child, and failure to protect alone can be a sufficient basis
for removing a child from parental custody and ultimately terminating
parental rights. The situation would be no different conceptually from one
in which a parent left a home shared with a child in a good neighborhood,
moved by herself to a blighted neighborhood, and refused to return to be
with the child because she had grown accustomed to the new surroundings
and formed new social connections.
Even with respect to the great majority of parents who would be willing—even delighted—to accept subsidies and services that facilitate relocation with their children, some might object to making relocation mandatory on the grounds that parents will be forcibly divorced from supportive
social networks, including extended family members. As noted above, any
assessment of a neighborhood should take into account such networks, so
a community should be declared unsuitable for children only if its harmful
aspects substantially outweigh its helpful aspects. In addition, there is evidence that social networks in blighted urban neighborhoods are in fact
quite weak relative to the networks that exist in better neighborhoods, into
which relocated families have been able to enter when participating in
housing voucher programs.168 Suburban residents are often initially resistant to entry of voucher users and suspicious of voucher users when they
first arrive, but soon after they welcome relocated families into their
community and social support network.169
Some might further argue, though, that the proper state response is to
eliminate chronic poverty and community dysfunction with infusion of
massive government resources. Rather than taking children en masse from
communities and parents, the state should invest heavily in making every
community fit. This approach would minimize disruption to family’s lives.
There can be reasonable disagreement about whether such a state transfer
of wealth from wealthier citizens to poor communities is morally permissible, morally required, or good public policy. Let us suppose that there is
a good case to be made for its being morally required. Nevertheless, it is
exceedingly unlikely to happen, because of political realities, and if it does
it will take many years to improve a neighborhood sufficiently for it to be
a safe and healthy place for children. Neither litigation nor lobbying is
likely to induce legislatures to do it. Past government initiatives to create
strong social structures in disorganized, dysfunctional neighborhoods have
usually been ineffective.170 Neighborhoods do change, but the change is
168.
David P. Varady & Carole C. Walker, Housing Vouchers and Residential Mobility, 18 J. OF
PLANNING LITERATURE 17, 26 (2003) (noting however, that a fundamental aim of the Section 8
voucher program is promoting free choice of residency).
169.
See Popkin & Cunningham, supra note 9, at 189; Rosenbaum et al., supra note 13, at 158.
170.
See ELLIOTT ET AL., supra note 27, at 294, 297; David Gonzalez, In the South Bronx, Blight
Returns to a Rehabilitated Block, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2011), http :/ / www. ny times. com / 20 11
/01 /07 / ny region /07 block. html? page wanted=all.
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usually very gradual, and it usually results in the dysfunctional community
simply being transplanted to a new location.
Thus, the problem of unfit communities is going to persist, and unless
and until it is eliminated, it should be a component of state decision making about children’s lives. Children are entitled to avoid living in horrible
places, absent countervailing considerations that make it in their best interests to live in them. They are entitled to have decisions about their lives
based on facts about the real world as it now is, not as some imagined
utopia. Adults are not required to make choices about their relationships
based on what life would be like in a perfect world, and the state should
not force upon children decisions about their relationships based on such
counter-factual speculation.
D. Effect on Community
Another set of objections charging that the reforms would do more
harm than good focuses on the effects on the larger group or environment.
On the one hand, it is plausible to think that the reforms I propose would
lead to the further deterioration of bad neighborhoods. On the other hand,
some might speculate that making people leave one bad place will just
result in transplantation of the blight to another place.
Emptying the worst neighborhoods of children would likely result in
withdrawal of government-provided services and programs, including
schools, that create jobs and infuse wealth; reduce already depressed property values; and rob the communities of any vibrancy and civic pride that
might now exist. To declare a neighborhood unfit for children is like condemning and evacuating a building, leaving it to crumble, one might maintain. However, to conclude from this concern that the state should continue to ignore the impact of community dysfunction on children’s welfare
when making decisions about the children’s lives, one would need to add a
major, normative premise along the lines of “the state should not sacrifice
the interests of adults who might remain in a community after the children
are removed, in order to protect the interests of children.” That major
premise is not at all plausible, for at least two reasons.
First, even if a balancing of adults’ and children’s interests were appropriate, the state should choose in this context to serve children’s interests, because they are clearly weightier. The marginal effect of my proposal on the lives of adults who would remain in condemned neighborhoods would be relatively small. When schools and other government services and programs for children close, some will lose jobs, but they can
look for work elsewhere, with competition for the jobs reduced by the exit
of many parents. Losses in property values are more likely to be felt by
absentee landlords than by residents; in fact, rents might drop for tenants
of housing projects. And loss of any existing vitality and pride would in-
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flict just a modest psychological cost. In contrast, children’s fundamental
developmental interests, and indeed survival, are at stake.
Second, such a balancing is not appropriate. Again, when the state
presumes to make such profound decisions about the intimate lives of private individuals, which it can justifiably do only because some private
individuals are incapable of making the decisions themselves, it must aim
to match as closely as possible the decision making the individuals themselves would do if able. There is no justification for injecting others’ interests into the decision calculus. Surely adults are entitled to, and generally do, decide where they will live without compromising their selfregarding interests in order to bolster struggling communities. Children
should have an equivalent legal right, one protecting their interests rather
than their choices, effectuated by the state as surrogate, to exit and stay
out of communities that are unfit for children, or simply to be in a better
neighborhood if that is, on the whole, in their best interests, taking into
account their existing ties to people and places. They should not be held
hostage in horrible neighborhoods to guard against the danger of further
deterioration.
Lastly, further community disintegration would not necessarily be the
ultimate consequence of facilitating children’s exit from currently dysfunctional communities. A public declaration that a community is unfit for
children and that the state will pursue a policy of making the community
childless might trigger sufficient sympathy for the adults living in that
community to generate more public support for rejuvenation projects than
has ever before existed. It might also motivate some adults living in such a
community to organize internal rejuvenation efforts. All the proposals
could generate increased awareness of a situation that is certainly unjust to
the children and arguably unjust to the adults, as well.
As for the fatalistic prediction that the state cannot eliminate problems
by moving people, because the problems will move with them, that is
much more plausible with respect to state decisions to order all residents
of an area to evacuate.171 My “no-child zone” proposal is superior to an
all-out condemnation of a neighborhood from a child welfare and public
health perspective because it would divide custodial parents and their
children from other residents in unfit communities. It would cause children
to grow up in different places with very different influences from what
they now experience, leaving as far behind as possible the bulk of those
who perpetuate the dysfunction by operating the drug trade and engaging
in violence. Of course, some custodial parents are involved in illegal activ171.
See Alexandra M. Curley, Dispersing the Poor: New Directions in Public Housing Policy, in
CHILD POVERTY IN AMERICA TODAY, VOL. 4: CHILDREN AND THE STATE 71, 85 (Barbara J. Arrighi
& David J. Maume eds. 2007) (discussing this problem with respect to the component of the federal
Hope VI program that involves rebuilding housing projects).
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ities, but relocating them might end that involvement. Some existing federal housing subsidies have dispersed aid recipients thinly throughout areas
outside the city center, to avoid creating a concentration of poor households in any one area, and that approach has been successful.172 Of course,
some people who relocate retain ties to the inner city, at least for a while,
and that might be more likely with people who are coerced into moving
than has been the case with people who voluntarily choose to move. This
is a fear of receiving communities. But experience with existing programs
reveals an eventual shift in focus by parents and children, as they become
accepted into, accustomed to, and appreciative of their safer and healthier
new environments.173
E. Infringement of Adults’ Constitutional Rights
In addition to the policy questions raised above, the reforms I propose,
because they might interfere with individuals’ freedom to choose where
they live or result in depriving people of legal parent status or custody of
children, could well be constitutionally problematic. This Subpart first
articulates the contours of the constitutional rights potentially infringed to
determine whether adults would have colorable claims to constitutional
protection, and then discusses states’ defenses of the reforms against any
constitutional challenges.
1. Freedom in Choice of Residential Location
The freedom to choose where one lives is, as an empirical matter, an
important liberty that we ordinarily take for granted. It would therefore
seem straightforwardly within the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is not clear, though, which strand of Fourteenth Amendment doctrine, if any, would support a complaint against the reforms I propose on
the grounds that they coerce residential choices.174 There are several possibilities.

172.
See id. at 73 (asserting that the federal Moving to Opportunity demonstration program, which
disperses residents of high-poverty inner-city neighborhoods to lower-poverty areas using housing
vouchers, “was successful in dramatically improving housing and neighborhood conditions for families,” who generally integrated into a new social network rather than recreating the old one in a new
place); G. Thomas Kingsley, Taking Advantage of What We Have Learned, in FROM DESPAIR TO
HOPE, supra note 2, at 266–67; Rosenbaum et al., supra note 13, at 156–58; Simpson, supra note 4,
at 221–22.
173.
Rosenbaum et al., supra note 13, at 161–70; Kingsley, supra note 172, at 266.
174.
See Zick, supra note 102, at 538–39 (suggesting ambivalence on the part of the drafters of the
Constitution as to a right to migrate among the states).
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a. Right To Travel
First, there are right to travel cases. The Supreme Court has characterized the right very broadly, requiring “that all citizens be free to travel
throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes,
rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.”175 Though these cases typically involve deterrents to people who
want to relocate, presumably the right includes protection of freedom not
to move as well as freedom to move. In many of its decisions applying the
right, the Court has treated the right as principally a right against discrimination in conferral of government benefits based on how long one has
lived in a particular location, grounding the right in both the Equal Protection Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause.176 That sort of antidiscrimination protection is not pertinent to the present context; there
would be no discrimination based on term of residency. There is some
discrimination, based on parental status or parental aspiration, because the
reforms target parents and would-be parents. However, those persons are
obviously not similarly situated to people who are not parents or seeking
parental status, in terms of the basic aim of the reforms, so an equal protection claim would not go very far.
In a few cases, the Court has addressed direct restrictions on movements into a state, but it analyzed them in terms of state violation of the
Interstate Commerce Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause,177
and such an analysis also would not be pertinent to the reforms I propose.
Lower courts have addressed prohibitions on leaving a state, analyzing
such prohibitions under the Due Process Clause, but only in the criminal
context, generally upholding such restrictions as conditions of parole.178
The principle underlying the direct restriction cases might be aptly extended to the present context if a state were to try to induce people to relocate across state lines, but only if there were that interstate dimension.
Supreme Court decisions have applied this right, insofar as it is embodied
in the federal Constitution, only to restrictions on interstate travel, not to
restrictions on freedom of movement within a state.179 In any state, the
175.
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651 (1974).
176.
See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). Cf. Zick, supra note 102, at 539 (noting that the
Supreme Court has never settled on a definite textual home for the right to travel).
177.
See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 168 (1941) (holding that a state law prohibiting
transportation of indigent people into the state of California violates the Commerce Clause); United
States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 298–99 (1920) (holding that deportation of non-citizens from a state
potentially violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause, insofar as it denied to non-citizens a freedom
to live peaceably in the state that citizens of the state enjoyed); see also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745, 759–60 (1966) (affirming that a constitutional right to travel exists, and so a violation of it by state
actors could be the subject of a civil rights suit, but without identifying a textual basis for the right).
178.
See, e.g., Pelland v. Rhode Island, 317 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D.R.I. 2004).
179.
See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500 (characterizing the “right to travel” as protecting “[(1)] the right
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residential locations that could be considered categorically unfit for children make up only a tiny fraction of all the locations where people in the
state can live, so inducing parents or would-be parents to exit or not to
move into such locations could not plausibly be viewed as coercing exit
from or deterring entry into the state. Thus, this line of Supreme Court
doctrine would not support an objection.
Some lower courts have found in the Federal Constitution a fundamental right to freedom of intrastate travel.180 Most have addressed either residency requirements at the municipal level or direct restrictions on movement, such as laws against “cruising” or loitering.181 One federal appellate
court decision, though, addressed as an infringement of a right to intrastate travel a city’s excluding persons convicted of drug crimes from residing in, or even entering, certain “drug zones.”182 The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals acknowledged that “the City’s interest in enacting the Ordinance—to enhance the quality of life in drug-plagued neighborhoods and to
protect the health, safety, and welfare of citizens in those areas—
represents a compelling government interest,” but found that the ordinance
was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to address the problem of drug
crime recidivism, and so the court invalidated the ordinance.183 Objections
to considering neighborhood quality in various parenting contexts could
invoke that decision in aid of a demand that laws directing such consideration be subjected to strict scrutiny. Many other circuit courts, though,
have declined to recognize constitutional protection of free intrastate travel.184 The Eighth Circuit, addressing a challenge to a law prohibiting sex
offenders from living near schools, found it unnecessary to decide whether
there is such a constitutional right, because it determined that the law did
not limit anyone’s freedom to travel throughout the state, implicitly treating a prohibition on living in a particular place as not restricting one’s
freedom to travel to that place.185 Thus, there is some support at the federof a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, [(2)] the right to be treated as a welcome
visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State, and, [(3)] for
those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of
that State”); Green v. Minn. Dep’t Human Servs., 755 N.W.2d 713, 725–26 (Minn. 2008) (holding
that federal right to travel was not implicated by state law rule that members of Native American tribes
who qualified for TANF benefits from a tribe had to accept benefits from the tribe and could not
demand referral to program of neighboring county); Pelland, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 90. See also Zick,
supra note 102, at 586–88 (explaining that courts have not clearly recognized a right to intrastate
travel under the federal constitution). There might be state constitutional analogues that address infringement of a right to travel within a state’s borders, but we need not go there to find constitutional
rights implicated by my proposals, as discussed below.
180.
See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 712–13 (8th Cir. 2005).
181.
Id.
182.
Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 493 (6th Cir. 2002).
183.
Id. at 502.
184.
See Miller, 405 F.3d at 713 (citing cases).
185.
Id. That determination would appear inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s treatment of laws
and policies that deter people from establishing a new residence in a state as infringing the right to
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al appellate level for attributing a fundamental constitutional right to freedom of intrastate travel and for finding that laws excluding people from
particular places infringe that right, but that support is slim at this point.
A final, and perhaps most relevant, group of lower court decisions under the right to travel umbrella addresses constitutional objections by custodial parents who wish to relocate and who are told they will lose custody
to the other parent if they do. That sort of order is analogous to both the
zoning proposal and the proposal to consider the relative quality of parents’ neighborhoods in post-divorce custody decisions, insofar as they
involve a threat by the state to deny custody of a child to a parent based on
the parent’s choice as to residence. One state supreme court has held that
such an order violated a custodial parent’s constitutional right to travel,
but most state appellate courts have held that the best interests of the child
is sufficient justification for burdening the custodial parent’s exercise of
the right to travel.186 The prevailing view thus suggests that the reforms I
propose could trigger a right to travel challenge, but that the challenge
should fail if the state can show that the reforms improve the health and
safety of children.
b. Takings
Second, there are cases in which governments need private property
for public purposes, such as construction of a highway, and they exert
eminent domain power over the property, effectively forcing anyone living
on the property to move. Significantly, the public purpose in some cases
the Supreme Court has addressed was to renovate a blighted area.187 Curiously, such cases get addressed solely under the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, which applies to states by means of the Fourteenth
Amendment, even though they involve not only a taking of property but
also compelling people to leave their homes.188 Courts generally uphold
such state actions, requiring simply that they serve a genuine public purpose, rather than merely providing a benefit to other private parties, such
as developers.189 Eliminating blight is an accepted public purpose.190 This
interstate travel; the Court has not rejected right to travel claims in such cases on the grounds that
denying benefits to new residents would not preclude them from traveling to the state. For discussion
of other federal and state court decisions relating to restrictions on sex offenders, see Zick, supra note
102, at 572–76.
186.
See, e.g., Baxendale v. Raich, 878 N.E.2d 1252, 1259 (Ind. 2008) (holding that order changing custody to father if mother moves to another state did not violate mother’s right to travel because
the burden on her relationship with her children was modest and was justified by the children’s best
interests) (citing similar decisions in other states).
187.
See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477–78 (2005); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S.
26, 33–34 (1954). Many lower court decisions address such situations as well. See, e.g., Fulmore v.
Charlotte County, 928 So.2d 1281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
188.
See, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475.
189.
See id. at 477–78. The Supreme Court has stated, though, that an incidental benefit to a pri-
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might seem inconsistent with the popular belief that property rights are
fundamental, but the Constitution specifically addresses taking of property
and appears to bestow blanket permission for it, simply conditioning the
permission on a requirement of paying the property owners appropriate
compensation.191 In any case, the reforms I propose do not entail the state
taking title to property.
In the related area of “regulatory takings,” local governments sometimes deem some buildings uninhabitable and command their evacuation,
without intending to take title to the property themselves. Courts have
assimilated such cases to the Takings doctrine, treating forced termination
of a lease as a taking of a property interest, and they have generally
upheld these decisions so long as they “bear a substantial relation to public
health, safety, morals, or the general welfare . . . .”192 These cases present
a closer analogy to the proposed zoning reform than do the eminent domain cases; in inducing parents and potential parents to relocate from certain neighborhoods, the state would effectively be partially condemning a
neighborhood (rather than just single buildings) and diminishing the market value of properties. My proposal would differ insofar as the evacuation
at which they aim is limited to children and their parents, rather than to all
persons living in a building. That difference would sufficiently reduce the
economic impact on property owners so that no compensation should be
owed property owners,193 and it makes it easier to show a substantial relation to the health and welfare of persons.
c. Substantive Due Process
The closest doctrinal fit for a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the
reforms at issue here, though, would appear to be the substantive due
process analysis of land use regulations that limit who can live together in
particular localities. The Supreme Court has not established a fundamental
right to live where one wishes, but it has on at least one occasion struck
vate party is permissible. Id. at 485–86.
190.
See George Lefcoe, After Kelo, Curbing Opportunistic TIF-Driven Economic Development:
Forgoing Ineffectual Blight Tests; Empowering Property Owners and School Districts, 83 TUL. L.
REV. 45, 51–66 (2008).
191.
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”). Cf. Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 57 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he power of eminent
domain is ‘a fundamental and necessary attribute of sovereignty, superior to all private property
rights.’” (quoting Rosenthal & Rosenthal, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 771 F.2d 44, 45 (2d
Cir. 1985) (per curiam))).
192.
See, e.g., Devines v. Maier, 665 F.2d 138, 145 (7th Cir. 1981); see also Zick, supra note
102, at 575–76 (discussing judicial treatment of sex offender exclusion laws that result in some sex
offenders having to leave their existing homes as regulatory takings).
193.
See Carol Necole Brown, Taking the Takings Claim: A Policy and Economic Analysis of the
Survival of Takings Claims After Property Transfers, 36 CONN. L. REV. 7, 18–19, 21–23 (2003)
(discussing “noncategorical regulatory taking[s]”).

2011]

No Place for Children

949

down a regulation that constrained the types of family relationships that
people are permitted to have in a particular residential area.194 The leading
Supreme Court authority in this doctrinal area is the 1977 plurality decision in Moore v. City of East Cleveland.195 In Moore, the Court invalidated a local ordinance prohibiting occupancy of a dwelling by persons
who did not form a traditional unitary family, when a woman caring for
two grandchildren was charged with violating the ordinance because she
also had an uncle and cousin of the children living in her house.196 The
plurality noted that whereas due process challenges to land use regulation
generally trigger only rational basis review—requiring the state to show
simply that the regulation is a rational means of serving a legitimate state
interest—when a land use regulation has the affect of interfering with
family life, it should apply heightened scrutiny.197 The plurality then found
that the ordinance was not closely related to a compelling state interest,
having as its principal aim the relatively unimportant one of avoiding excessive car traffic in a neighborhood.198
Lower courts have analyzed under this substantive due process rubric
restrictions on where former sex offenders can live, which typically preclude their living near schools and other places where children congregate.
These restrictions serve the same broader purpose as my proposals, separating children from unrelated adults that would endanger them by living
in the same neighborhoods. Convicted sex offenders have challenged these
restrictions, arguing in part that the restrictions affected their family lives,
either forcing other family members also to abide by the restrictions or
forcing a family to split up into different residences.199 Courts have generally upheld the restrictions, finding that such restrictions do not infringe a
fundamental right and that they serve sufficiently well the legitimate state
interest of protecting children from abuse.200 Lower federal courts have
also generally rejected the notion of a constitutional right to be in public

194.
Cf. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 714 (8th Cir. 2005) (reaffirming Eighth Circuit’s rejection
of such a right).
195.
431 U.S. 494 (1977). An infamous Supreme Court decision upholding the forced relocation of
Japanese-American citizens during World War II, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944), appeared to analyze the relocation as an equal protection matter, rather than substantive due
process. The Korematsu decision is widely assumed to be repudiated by, and in fact an embarrassment
to, the Court. See David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First
Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 319, 343
(1994). This is so not because of any conclusion that forced relocation is always unconstitutional,
however, but rather because the policy targeted a specific racial group and rested on racist assumptions
that the Court failed to recognize.
196.
431 U.S. at 496–97.
197.
Id. at 498–99.
198.
Id. at 500.
199.
See, e.g., Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005).
200.
See id. at 710–14.
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places,201 and the constitutionality of quarantine measures is longestablished.202
An outright ban on children living in unfit communities arguably resembles the zoning ordinance at issue in Moore more than the restrictions
on individuals in the sex offender, public spaces, and quarantine cases. It
would directly aim at, rather than having the incidental effect of, precluding certain family configurations in certain places. A court might therefore
apply heightened scrutiny to such a ban. My proposals for reforming domestic relations and child protection law also directly target family life,
but they do not amount to an outright ban on any collection of individuals
residing together; they simply make an adult’s residential location one
factor in a decision as to whether she can share her home with a child. A
threshold question would therefore be whether simply making a person’s
location a relevant consideration burdens the right to live with family
where one wishes so much as to constitute an infringement of fundamental
liberty rights. Courts might well answer that question negatively, but I will
assume for the sake of argument that an infringement would be found,
thereby forcing the state to show that considering location in decisions
about children’s family life is necessary to serve a compelling state interest.
In sum, courts have not been especially protective of individuals’ desires to live in particular places, so there is no clear basis or especially
strong support for an objection based on a supposed constitutional right to
live wherever one wants and to do so without the state imposing costs
based on the place one chooses.203 The best doctrinal category for a constitutional challenge to laws imposing a cost on parents or would-be parents
because of where they live would be substantive due process, charging that
such laws effectively limit the types of families that can live in certain
locations. Because the laws impact family life, courts might well apply
heightened scrutiny. I consider below, after discussing other plausible
rights claims, whether my proposals could survive such scrutiny.
2. Parental Rights
An alternative constitutional challenge to both sets of proposals would
rest not on a protected right to choose where one lives, but rather on a
protected right to be a legal parent or to have custody of a child. The Supreme Court has issued a significant number of decisions relating to both
the right of biological parents to be legal parents and the right of legal
parents to raise their children as they see fit without government interfe201.
202.
203.

See Zick, supra note 102, at 604.
See id. at 586–87.
See generally id.
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rence. Unfortunately, the Court’s last word on both of these parentingrelated rights was ambiguous, because the most recent decisions in each
realm were plurality decisions, without a majority of the Court agreeing
on what the controlling constitutional test or principle is. These decisions
leave somewhat uncertain exactly when the right is burdened and what test
the state must pass for laws burdening the right to be upheld.
a. Right to Legal Parenthood
In a series of four decisions addressing claims to legal parenthood by
biological fathers who were not married to the mothers of the children at
issue, the Supreme Court established as a general rule that such men are to
receive constitutional protection of their interest in being legal parents of
their offspring if and only if they are fit to parent and have established a
relationship with the child or demonstrated a commitment to parenting.204
There is no reason to suppose the Court would dispense with the fitness
condition for constitutional protection with respect to would-be parents
other than unwed biological fathers; the Court is unlikely to proclaim that
unwed fathers may be excluded from legal parenthood because of unfitness
but wed fathers and mothers may not. Thus, under existing doctrine, a
state may deny legal parenthood to any biological parent on the grounds
that the biological parent is unfit, and the Court has never presumed to
dictate how states should define parental fitness. A state might deem living
in a horrible place per se unfit to raise a child, and under existing doctrine, this would not even infringe biological parents’ constitutional rights
with respect to legal parentage. Certainly, simply making residential location a relevant factor in an individualized parentage decision would not
infringe those rights.
In a later decision concerning the constitutional rights of unwed fathers, and the Court’s most recent decision, Michael H. v. Gerard D.,205
the four Justices supporting the plurality opinion announced that it is not in
fact sufficient for receiving constitutional protection of an interest in parenthood that one show biological parenthood and a relationship or commitment. Rather, the plurality said, the Constitution protects the “unitary
family,” which the plurality suggested would mean a child, the child’s
mother, and a man who is the mother’s husband or who is living with the
mother.206 Under this rule, a biological father would receive no constitutional protection of his interest in being a child’s legal father unless he is
married to, or at least cohabiting with, the child’s mother. Moreover,
though rejecting the biology-plus-commitment/relationship test that the
204.
205.
206.

See Dwyer, supra note 43, at 813–16.
491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 123–24.
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earlier cases seemed to establish, the plurality gave no indication that it
would dispense with the fitness requirement for constitutional protection.
As noted above, a finding of unfitness could rest in whole or in part on a
person’s living in a place that is unsuitable for children.
In sum, only limited categories of adults enjoy any constitutional protection of their desires to be legal parents even if they are fit, none who
are unfit enjoy constitutional protection, and a state could treat a wholly
unsuitable community environment as a basis for finding unfitness just as
it now treats an unsuitable home environment as a basis for finding unfitness. Thus, both when it establishes legal parent-child relationships and
when it suspends or terminates existing legal parent-child relationships, the
state might be free to deny legal parent status to adults based in part on
where the adults live, without being constitutionally compelled to justify
its doing so. If, on the other hand, courts were to reject the idea that living
in a horrible place makes one an unfit parent, then they would subject denials of legal parent status to constitutional scrutiny in some cases.
b. Control Rights of Legal Parents
With respect to constitutional rights of people after they become legal
parents, and when their remaining legal parents is not at issue, the Court
has consistently held that legal parents receive some constitutional protection of their freedom and parenting choices under the Due Process
Clause.207 The Court’s decisions, which have principally concerned parental control over children’s education, have not made clear how strong parents’ child rearing rights are or what constitutional test applies. In cases
involving only a substantive due process claim, the Court has appeared to
apply rational basis review.208 In its most parent-protective decision ever,
Wisconsin v. Yoder,209 holding that Amish parents must be exempted to
some degree from compulsory schooling laws, the parents’ claim to control of their children’s education rested on a free exercise of religion right
as well as a substantive due process right, and the Court intimated that the
religious dimension of the parents’ desires elevated the level of judicial
scrutiny.210 There would be a religious dimension in the cult compound
cases alluded to in the Introduction of this Article, but generally not in the
context of communities that are unfit by virtue of violent crimes, drugs,
207.
See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion) (holding that state court addressing non-parent petition for visitation with a child must accord some deference to the parent’s
views of the child’s interests, and citing earlier Supreme Court decisions on child rearing rights of
legal parents).
208.
See David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal, Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 141–42 (Supp. 2006).
209.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
210.
Id. at 215, 233.
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and other dysfunctions associated with chronic and pervasive poverty.
Whether Yoder is still good law and, if so, to what extent it applies to
groups other than the Amish are open questions,211 but I will assume religious enclaves would have a relatively strong constitutional claim against
evacuation of children from their communities, potentially triggering some
form of heightened judicial review.212
In its most recent decision regarding parental control rights, Troxel v.
Granville,213 the Court seemed to treat a parental substantive due process
right simpliciter as a fairly weak right, requiring only that the state accord
some presumption or deference to legal parents’ views of the child’s best
interests when a third party demands visitation with a child.214 The Court
did not reject the best-interests test as a basis for overriding parental wishes. In sum, then, Supreme Court doctrine on parental freedom to make
child-rearing decisions, which would include deciding where to live with
one’s child, suggests that parents would receive some constitutional protection for their residential choices, but not especially strong protection.
3. State Defense of the Reforms
The review of doctrinal categories above reveals that parents affected
by my proposals could mount a constitutional challenge to them, most
likely grounded in substantive due process, with the specific rights to live
with family members and to have authority over the lives of their legal
children having the most promise. They might allege a violation of their
children’s constitutional rights as well, insofar as children also have important interests in connection with where and with whom they live. All
such rights, however, would allow for infringement if the state has sufficient justification for doing so.215 Some of the rights might trigger only
rational basis review, requiring the state to show merely that counting
community unfitness against a person could serve a legitimate state interest, and the state could easily meet that burden. The proposals would have
the aim and effect of causing some children to live in decent communities
rather than neighborhoods that endanger their welfare, and avoiding dangers to children’s welfare is clearly a legitimate state interest.
211.
See Douglas Cnty. v. Anaya, 694 N.W.2d 601, 605–08 (Neb. 2005) (rejecting the argument
that a hybrid constitutional claim asserting both free exercise and parental rights triggers strict scrutiny
of state action).
212.
Courts are currently divided as to whether parental free exercise cases present a “hybrid
rights” situation, within the meaning of dictum in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), triggering a higher level of scrutiny than applies when individuals assert only a free exercise
right. See James G. Dwyer, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Employment Division v. Smith for
Family Law, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 1787–88 (2011).
213.
530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion).
214.
See Meyer, supra note 208, at 141–42.
215.
See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 499 (1999).
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At least one of the many possible rights claims, though, might trigger
heightened scrutiny of some sort, perhaps even strict scrutiny, and therefore might require states to make the much stronger showing that its policies are necessary to serve a compelling state interest. Interestingly, the
claim most likely to trigger strict scrutiny, given existing doctrine, is not a
claim to constitutional protection of one’s interest in becoming a parent
nor to constitutional protection of one’s freedom in making child rearing
decisions, but rather a substantive due process claim against the states dictating what kinds of families can live in certain places. Most likely,
though, were the courts to address constitutional objections by birth mothers to being deprived of a legal relationship with babies because of where
they live, kinds of cases that have simply not before arisen, they would
uniformly find somehow that a fundamental constitutional right is at stake
and triggers strict scrutiny. Assuming the proposals advanced here would
be subjected to strict scrutiny, at least when challenged by some categories
of adults—for example, existing parents who are not otherwise unfit and
whose rights might be terminated if they do not move and birth mothers
who are denied legal parent status because of where they live, we must ask
whether they would serve a compelling state interest sufficiently well to
satisfy this demanding test, which presumes the law to be constitutionally
impermissible.
The compelling interest requirement is easily met. The Supreme Court
has consistently treated protection of children’s health and safety as a
compelling state interest, even in cases where the only interest of children
at stake was an interest in education.216 In the case of unfit communities,
not only children’s educational interest, but their very survival is at
stake.217
Courts’ resolutions of constitutional challenges to the reform proposals
would therefore turn on the fit between the proposals and the aim of safeguarding children’s welfare. Specifically, courts would inquire whether
the state could effectively pursue some other means of protecting the
children without infringing the constitutional rights. With respect to the

216.
See Dwyer, supra note 43, at 819 n.258. A number of lower courts have held, in the context
of custodial parent relocation, that protecting the welfare of the child, in terms of the child’s continuing a relationship with the non-custodial parent, is a compelling state interest sufficient to justify infringing the custodial parent’s right to travel. See Linda D. Elrod, States Differ on Relocation: A
Panorama of Expanding Case Law, FAM. ADVOC., at 8 (Spring 2006). Some state courts have authorized a parent to relocate with a child despite the other parent’s objection but not on the basis of a
holding that protecting the child’s welfare is not a compelling state interest. Id.
217.
Protecting children would also satisfy the public purpose requirement for takings, if the proposals were viewed as burdening adults’ property rights in their existing residence. Cf. Kelo v. City of
New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484–85 (2005) (noting that the Court had treated as public purposes
facilitating agriculture and mining, “transforming a blighted area into a ‘well-balanced’ community
through redevelopment,” and “breaking up a land oligopoly,” eliminating a “‘significant barrier to
entry in the pesticide market’” (citations omitted)).
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proposal for declaring communities unfit and prohibiting residence by
children in them, the only apparent alternative would be to eliminate unfit
communities. Complaining parties might assert that states should be required to eliminate the community dysfunctions that pervade children’s
lives in the nation’s worst neighborhoods, rather than aiming to evacuate
children from those places. I considered above such an argument couched
just in moral terms, agreed with the argument, and then noted that as a
matter of real world politics, the desired outcome is unlikely to happen.
Now, though, the question is whether a constitutional lever might be used
to force states to achieve this outcome of eliminating the ills associated
with chronic and pervasive poverty and to do so fairly expeditiously.
Of course, fear of that constitutional lever might deter states and localities from adopting any of my proposals. However, as noted above, a
countervailing constitutional claim, on behalf of children, might be used to
force the state’s hand. Here I would note that a court might well conclude
that it is simply unreasonable to expect a state to pursue this other means
of protecting children. Community dysfunction in the worst urban areas
arguably runs so deep, and arises to a large extent from private conduct
the state cannot completely control, that no amount of money is going to
make it functional and suitable for children. Even if it could, that likely
could occur only over a long period of time, during which time children
would remain in danger, and only by displacing the criminal element to a
different location, where the same problem would arise. Eliminating all
dysfunctional communities and not creating new ones would probably require taking over the lives of the many dysfunctional people who now live
in horrible neighborhoods, to an extent that would infringe their constitutional rights. Thinking realistically about the challenges that such people
and places pose, therefore, a court should conclude that the Constitution
does not require states to eliminate community unfitness rather than trying
to keep children out of communities that are now unfit for them.
Significantly, states are not required to find ways of eliminating blight
without moving people out when they condemn areas and declare them
unsuitable for any human habitation. And in the analogous context of declaring homes unfit, states now routinely dictate that certain homes must be
child-free, because of the adults who live there and the conditions those
adults create, and that practice is not deemed constitutionally problematic.
This is so even though it would be much more feasible for the state itself
to improve the conditions within individual homes so that children may
safely live there—for example, by ordering certain adults to stay away and
posting a guard to enforce the order, than it would be for the state to
transform horrible neighborhoods. If states can remove children from parental custody and even terminate parental rights because parents do not
take the necessary steps to ensure that their homes are safe and healthy
places, without violating parents’ constitutional rights, then they should
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also be constitutionally permitted to remove children from parental custody and terminate parental rights if parents refuse to take steps necessary to
ensure that they live in a neighborhood that is safe and healthy for their
children (i.e., moving). In addition, as noted in Part II, courts in child
protection proceedings are increasingly ordering an abusive parent out of
the house so that the child can remain, thereby denying that parent both
the freedom to live wherever he wishes and custody of his child, for the
sake of protecting the child’s welfare.
What a court might require the state to do, when it orders evacuation
of children from unfit communities or when it threatens to deny legal parent status or custody to someone, is to provide adequate relocation assistance. As to any parents who would be willing to relocate if they had the
resources, but who are truly unable to afford to do so, providing relocation assistance is clearly a preferable and perhaps constitutionally mandatory alternative to severing the parents’ connection with children. Thus, a
potential strategy for forcing states to provide greater funding for relocation programs than they currently do might be to first advance a constitutional claim on behalf of children, challenging state laws that cause them
to live in horrible neighborhoods, and then, when the state commands that
children may not live in such places, to advance a constitutional claim by
parents against the state’s effectively forcing them to relocate without providing the necessary assistance for them to do so.
F. Summary
Adults adversely affected as a result of the legal system considering
the quality of the community they live in when determining parentage or
custody of a child cannot plausibly object that they are being unfairly punished, that doing so would have an unjustifiable impact on an historically
subordinate group or on a community, that doing so would not in fact help
children, or that their constitutional rights are being violated. This is true
also of zoning the worst residential areas adult-only, because evacuating
children from those places does appear the only realistic way of serving
the state’s compelling aim—and moral and constitutional obligation—to
spare children from living in terribly unsafe and unhealthy environments.
Adversely affected persons might have a valid complaint against a society
and an economic system that tolerates great disparities in wealth and horrible living conditions for some, and that does too little to help people
overcome addictions and other personal deficiencies, but that complaint
does not warrant forcing the next generation to be subjected to the same
horrible living conditions and damaged in the same way that preceding
generations were. At most, those adults might have a constitutional right
to state assistance in relocating.

2011]

No Place for Children

957

CONCLUSION
Growing up in a dangerous and unhealthy neighborhood is neither inevitable nor excusable for any child, even though the existence of such
places might be inevitable in a society like ours. For many, it is difficult to
see that the presence of children today in such places is a contingent fact,
representing a policy choice on the part of the state. But it is a choice and
that choice requires defense, given that children have a presumptive moral
and constitutional right against the state placing them into relationships
with and the custody of adults who live in such places. The state could do
otherwise, and I have proposed reforms by which the state could ensure
that children do not grow up in such places. The weakness of the objections to those proposals suggests that the current state of affairs is in fact
indefensible.
Implementing the proposed changes to domestic relations and child
protection law would not pose significant practical difficulties. When
children are already in the child protective system or already the subject of
other court proceedings because of a dispute between legal parents, it is a
simple matter to add neighborhood quality to the list of factors that inform
decision making. It would likely result in more children being placed into
families with adults who are not biological parents, and at some point the
supply of adoption applicants might be exhausted, but legal decision making for any child always takes into account the available alternatives. In
disputes between two parents or between two applicants for adoption, a
choice between them taking into account neighborhood quality imposes no
additional cost on the state other than some additional evidence taking.
The more difficult component of the reforms is mandating relocations
as a condition for parental status and custody. This is in part because of
problems inherent in any welfare programs targeting children, such as the
moral hazard of creating an incentive to have more children, but the state
now has many decades of experience dealing with such problems, and the
problems have not led many to conclude that we should simply not give
any parents child rearing subsidies. It is also in part because relocating can
be arduous for adults and children, especially if their new communities are
not entirely welcoming, which is sometimes the case. Policing the exclusion of children could be difficult, because a parent could keep a child
hidden away in an apartment to avoid detection, but as a neighborhood
becomes near-childless, few parents will want to remain in them anyway
and a child’s presence will be less likely to go unnoticed by neighbors,
who might report violations. Some transplanted teens might seek to return,
maintain gang and drug-trade involvement, or bring their behavioral problems to the new location. But policing against return would be little different from the enforcement of curfews that police now do, and any concerns
regarding older children will arise only when a neighborhood is first de-

41

958

Alabama Law Review

[Vol.62:5:887

clared unfit, because any relocations later in time should only be of newborns.
Further complexity arises from neighborhood dynamism; governing
regulations would need to account for change in community conditions
over time, positive or negative, and would need to guard against repeated
changes in a neighborhood’s status, in order to create some stability. That
should be a fairly simple matter. Additionally, there is the concern about
disrupting relationships of inter-dependency; some special attention would
need to be paid to non-parent adults left behind who have been dependent
for care on those who leave and who might now need the state to provide
transportation or alternative caregivers. And the power to declare neighborhoods unfit is one susceptible to abuse for reasons of political strategy,
personal gain by politicians, and race- or class-based prejudice. Residents
would need to have recourse to costless administrative or judicial proceedings to participate in or challenge zoning decisions, but that is generally
already true today.
Against these various difficulties and costs, some of which are inherent in relocation and renewal programs that the state already operates,
must be weighed the grave dangers that children face in our nation’s most
dysfunctional communities and the enormous social costs that result from
the damage neighborhood dysfunction causes children. To spare children
from those dangers and society from those long-term costs, the state and
parents should be willing to endure some transitional hardships and the
costs of administration and enforcement.
As noted in the Introduction, the ideas and analysis presented here
could be extended to communities that are dysfunctional, from the state’s
perspective, for reasons other than poverty. In the case of religious cults,
there would be an additional First Amendment objection to the state’s attempts to remove children from the community. Even if a free exercise
claim elevated the burden of justification borne by the state, however, its
compelling interest in protecting children from an abusive and intellectually oppressive environment would satisfy that burden in places like the
Branch Davidian Compound and the Yearning for Zion Ranch.
The ideas and analysis might even be extended to the international
context; there might be entire nations or regions within other nations that
are unfit for children, because of famine or war, and it might be appropriate to consider whether modern western nations or international governing
bodies have some obligation and license to enact policies designed to remove as many children as possible from those places, with or without the
support of private citizens or governments in those places. The basic idea
is the same: The world over, children reside in certain places because of
laws that determine at the time of their birth and thereafter which adults
will be their parents and which adults will have custody of them, and the
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governments that enact those laws should be held accountable for the consequences those laws have for children.
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